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redemptions in kind. Investors in illiquid funds with a greater likelihood of using redemptions in 
kind exhibit less run-like behavior. Redemptions in kind helps reduce the adverse effect of flow-
induced pressure on stock performance and improve fund performance subsequent to extreme 
investor redemptions. Offsetting these benefits, redemptions in kind also reduces investors’ flow 
sensitivity to good performance. I find further evidence suggesting that, when redeeming in kind, 
funds deliver illiquid securities during periods when the market is illiquid and volatile.  
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1. Introduction 
In their pursuit of superior performance, open-end mutual fund managers undertake a variety 
of investment strategies that differ in terms of time horizon and asset mix.  The success of such 
strategies though is susceptible in varying degrees to potential mismatch in the liquidity of assets 
and the liquidity of liabilities. Liability liquidity in this context is the investors’ ability to redeem 
fund shares on a daily basis at the day-ending net asset value (NAV). If these withdrawals are 
sufficiently large and unanticipated, they have the potential to disrupt funds’ operation forward, 
especially when fund managers invest in relatively illiquid assets. This, in turn, can impose a 
negative externality on investors that choose to stay in the fund. Managers utilize a number of 
means to address this type of liquidity risk including the use of cash holdings (Yan, 2006; Simutin, 
2014), borrowing internally within the family through interfund lending (Agarwal and Zhao, 2018), 
and borrowing externally from banks.  This study contributes to this literature by focus on another 
mechanism — redemptions in kind (henceforth “RIK”) wherein managers may elect to deliver 
securities held by the funds to redeeming investors in lieu of cash. 
By avoiding the need for asset sales, RIK mitigates the motivation for investor redemptions in 
expectation of others’ withdrawals. Such mechanism helps prevent fund runs. However, RIK 
passes liquidity costs associated with redemptions to redeeming investors, which could discourage 
investors’ demand for fund shares. 2  Moreover, when funds have the discretion over which 
securities to deliver in RIK, it might create a potential conflict of interest between fund manager 
and investors, amplifying the cost of implementing RIK.   
                                                          
2 Invesco Advisers, Inc., in its comment letter, states that “the primary problem with using redemptions in kind to 
meet large redemptions is the willingness and ability of the redeeming entity to receive securities instead of cash”. 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-15/s71615-75.pdf.  
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In this study, I investigate the motivations and consequences of RIK in managing mutual funds’ 
liquidity risks. To start with, I identify funds with greater likelihood of utilizing RIK to conduct 
ex-ante analysis. I first examine what fund characteristics are associated with funds’ choices in 
having RIK along with alternative liquidity management tools including cash and borrowing using 
the Seemingly Uncorrelated Regression (SUR) approach. Then I investigate how RIK affects 
investors’ investment and redemption behaviors. Next, I directly test, conditional on a large 
outflow, whether RIK helps reduce the price impact on the stocks held by funds and improve funds’ 
performance. In the later part of the paper, I identify actual RIK uses to shed light on how frequent 
RIK takes places and the magnitude of RIK transactions. Furthermore, I investigate funds’ choices 
in what types of securities to deliver in RIK.   
Section 18(f)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Rule 18f-1 control RIK. Under 
Section 18(f)(1), technically, if a fund uses RIK, it must be applied to all redeeming investors and 
with proportional shares taken from all underlying portfolio holdings.3 That is, all redeeming 
investors will receive a similar basket of shares mirroring the fund holdings. As such, this 
requirement limits a fund’s flexibility in utilizing RIK, which makes its use less operational 
feasible. Rule 18f-1, adopted in 1971, provides exemptions from this requirement of the Section 
18(f)(1). Specifically, it allows a fund apply RIK to redemptions that are either over $250,000 or 
1 percent of the NAV during any 90-day period with the selection of securities at funds’ discretion. 
However, for redemptions less than the aforementioned specified amount, the fund commits itself 
to pay in cash. Investment companies who would like to have this option can file the exemption 
                                                          
3 Section 18f-1: “it shall be unlawful for any registered open-end company to issue any class of senior security or to 
sell any senior security of which it is the issuer…” Michael S. Piwowar, the SEC then commissioner, made this 
following statement at the 2015 ICI mutual fund conference: “ however, an agreement by a fund to make payments to 
some shareholders in a manner different from payments to other shareholders, for example cash only rather than cash 
or in-kind, would be deemed to create a class of senior securities prohibited by Section 18f-1 of the Investment 
Company Act.” 
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with SEC under Rule 18f-1, and such practice is applied to all the funds managed by the investment 
company. Such election is irrevocable while the exemption is in effect.  
Taken together, this Rule 18f-1 provides funds greater flexibility to treat large and small 
redemptions differently and distribute specific securities at its discretion, making RIK more 
operational feasible for the fund. I exploit the filing of Form 18f-1 to conduct ex-ante analysis on 
motivations and consequences of RIK. I identify those funds who file for this exemption under 
rule 18f-1 as the ones with greater likelihood to use RIK compared to the other funds.  
Tax treatment of RIK is unique and complex that can be summarized as follows (see Colon 
(2017) for a more detailed discussion). With RIK, at the fund level, the fund does not recognize 
any gain or loss. If the distributed securities are associated with unrealized gains, §852(b)(6) 
applies, which exempts registered investment companies from gain recognition for RIK. 4 
Alternatively, the law states that a fund can avoid recognizing taxable gains on an appreciated 
stock with RIK. The capital gain associated with the stocks used in RIK is not realized at the time 
of in-kind redemptions. However, this part of capital gain is still reflected in the appreciation in 
the price of fund share. Essentially, investors remaining in the fund get to delay taxes until they 
sell the fund shares.5 If the distributed securities are associated with unrealized losses, they are 
covered by §311(a) and no loss is recognized.6 At the redeeming shareholders’ level, it is less clear. 
An article published in the Wall Street Journal in 1999, “’Redemptions in Kind’ Become Effective 
for Tax Management”7 mentions: “For investors redeeming fund shares, the tax hit is the same 
                                                          
4 See https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/852.  
5  “Vanguard Patented a Way to Avoid Taxes on Mutual Funds”, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-
vanguard-mutual-fund-tax-dodge/. “The main benefit of avoiding taxable gains in a mutual fund is tax deferral. Funds 
distribute their taxable gains to investors, who pay income taxes on them in the same year. By avoiding tax events 
within the fund, investors get to delay taxes until they sell the fund, which could be years or decades later. It’s akin to 
a zero-interest loan from the IRS.” 
6 See https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/311. 
7 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB921028092685519084.  
4 
 
whether the fund distributes cash or securities. Fund investors owe tax on the difference between 
what they paid for their fund shares and the proceeds they received, whether in securities or cash, 
says Robert Willens, tax and accounting analyst at Lehman Brothers.” In Appendix B, I provide 
an example to further illustrate the effect of RIK on taxes. In this dissertation, I focus on the 
liquidity management perspective of RIK and leave out the role of taxes for future research.  
I start with modeling the choices of liquidity management tools simultaneously using SUR 
approach and find that asset illiquidity at both the investment company and the fund levels are 
positively related to the likelihood of a funds’ utilizing RIK. Specifically, a fund company is more 
likely to apply for this exemption when the company manages more bond and/or balanced funds 
rather than equity funds. One standard deviation increase in the percentage of number of equity 
funds managed by the investment company decreases the unconditional probability of filling for 
RIK exemption by 2.85%. Similarly, a fund investing in comparatively more illiquid assets is 
associated with a higher propensity of filing for this exemption. Being an illiquid fund increases 
the unconditional probability of filling for RIK exemption by 10.5%. These results are consistent 
with the view that the need for liquidity management is greater for funds with more illiquid assets. 
Under this SUR framework, I further find that some common fund characteristics, such as flow 
volatility, fund age, and expense ratio, are positively associated with the use of multiple liquidity 
management tools. These observations suggest that certain common features of the fund, such as 
asset illiquidity, exotic fund strategy, and/or less predictable capital flows drive the use of all types 
of liquidity management tools. In addition, I observe a positive correlation in the residuals between 
RIK and the other liquidity management tools. I interpret these results as suggesting that RIK 
complements the other means of liquidity management tools such as holding cash and borrowing.  
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Next, I examine investors’ purchase and redemption behavior to further understand the benefits 
and costs associated with RIK to a fund. To a fund investor, the benefit of investing in a fund with 
RIK comes from the reduced costs associated with liquidity externality from other investors’ 
redemptions. This feature of RIK predicts a lower flow to performance sensitivity when funds 
perform poorly, which effect shall be stronger for funds investing in more illiquid assets. On the 
other hand, the cost to an investor is that when she redeems, there is a probability of receiving 
securities rather than cash from the fund. On top of that, with the exemption obtained under the 
Rule 18f-1, the manager decides on the basket of securities an investor receives. When an investor 
makes decisions on which funds to invest in, she takes into account both the benefits and costs 
associated with RIK. Empirically, we only observe the net effect from investors’ purchase decision.   
In the overall sample, when funds have a negative performance, I don’t find a significant 
difference in flow-performance sensitivity between funds with RIK and funds without.  However, 
in the subsample of illiquid funds, RIK reduces the sensitivity of outflows to poor performance by 
24%. This finding suggests that RIK helps reduce investors’ run-like behavior, but only for funds 
investing in more illiquid assets. In the positive performance regime, I find that filing for the 
exemption reduces flow-performance sensitivity. This finding suggests that investors do concern 
about the likelihood of receiving a basket of securities, which deters their investments in a fund 
with higher likelihood of utilizing RIK. Since we observe that different fund characteristics are 
associated with these two groups of funds, I conduct a matched sample analysis where I match the 
funds with RIK and without on observable fund and family characteristics. The results still hold.  
I then investigate, conditional on large outflows, whether RIK helps mitigate the price impacts 
due to asset fire sales by funds. Using the methodology developed in Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang 
(2012), for each stock-quarter, I construct hypothetical sales pressure from mutual fund fire sales 
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and decompose it into two components, sales pressure from funds with RIK exemption and sales 
pressure from funds without the exemption. I find that the quarterly cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) for the underlying stocks held by funds that have filed for the exemption are much smaller 
compared to the CARs of stocks held by funds that have not applied for exemption. This finding 
supports that RIK helps mitigate the asset sale costs associated with large outflows. I also compare 
fund performance conditional on a large outflow for funds with exemption to the performance of 
funds without the exemption that experience similar outflows. I find weak evidence that RIK helps 
mitigate the negative effect of large outflows on performance.  
To further understand the economic magnitude of RIK transactions and whether funds pick 
particular types of securities to deliver, I identify actual RIK utilizations from funds’ semi-annual 
financial statements. For fiscal years ending in 2004 to 2012, there are 713 RIK disclosures for 
385 funds. That is, around 12.8% of funds in the sample has used RIK during this period. I observe 
that funds use RIK throughout all the years and different market conditions. The year 2008 has the 
largest number of disclosures (118), suggesting that RIK is more likely to be used during the time 
when the market liquidity is low and has a poor prospect. Overall, RIK transactions at the 
aggregated semi-annual level are economically large, with mean and median dollar amount as 
$119 million and $61 million, respectively. In terms of percentage of fund’s TNA, the mean and 
median are 16% and 6%.  Following Lou (2012), I model funds’ portfolio churning behavior in 
response to net capital outflows using quarterly holdings data. I find that fund managers 
strategically pick stocks that are illiquid to deliver during time periods when the market is illiquid 
and volatile (2007-2012). Such pattern is not observed during the years when market is performing 
well and liquid (2004-2006).  
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This paper contributes to the liquidity management literature in the mutual fund industry (e.g., 
Chordia, 1996; Nanda et al., 2000; Yan, 2006; Goncalves-Pinto and Schmidt, 2013; Simutin, 2014; 
Chernenko and Sunderam, 2016; Agarwal and Zhao, 2018; Nanda and Wei, 2018). Funds utilize 
various means to manage liquidity risks. The fact that we observe funds using different ones at 
different times suggests that there are benefits and costs associated with each type of liquidity 
management tool depending on the nature of the liquidity shocks, the funds’ conditions, as well as 
the market condition. My study adds to this literature by providing insights on RIK, one liquidity 
management tool can be utilized by mutual funds.8 
This study is also related to the literature on fund fragility such as Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang 
(2010) and Zeng (2018) for mutual funds, Liu and Mello (2011) for hedge funds, and Kacperczyk 
and Schnabl (2013), and Schmidt, Timmermann, and Wermers (2016) for money market funds. 
Such complementarities are in the spirit of the bank-run literature going back to Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983). This issue is of first-order importance given recent evidence showing that financial 
fragility in the asset management industry can result in externalities from prices to real economy 
(Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2012; Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim, 2012; Hau and Lai, 2013). In 
this study, I show that, for illiquid funds, with the flexibility of implementing RIK to reduce the 
negative externalities, investors’ flows are less responsive to past poor performance. Furthermore, 
this study builds on asset fire sales literature (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, 1997; Coval and 
Stafford, 2007; Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad, 2011) and shows that RIK helps reduce the flow-
induced selling pressure on underlying assets held by the funds.  
                                                          
8 A similar tool can be utilized by funds is redemption restrictions. Under Rule 22e of the Investment Company Act, 
an open-end mutual fund is prohibited from suspending the right of redemption or postponing the payment of 
redemptions for more than seven days. The SEC has the right to deem emergency periods during which a fund is able 
to suspend redemptions. However, the fund needs to apply to the SEC at the time and obtain the approval, which may 
take some time and the final decision is not at the fund’s discretion. 
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the sample and variables construction. 
Section 3 investigates what characteristics are associated with higher likelihood of using RIK. 
Section 4 investigates consequences of a higher likelihood of using RIK, including the effects on 
flow-performance sensitivity, price impact from asset fire sales, and fund performance conditional 
on large outflows. Section 5 provides ex-post analysis on actual RIK disclosures and Section 6 
concludes.    
2. Sample and variable construction 
The empirical analysis focuses on 2,966 actively managed equity funds from the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices Mutual Fund (CRSPMF) database between years 2006 and 2015. I 
use two parts of data to construct the final dataset. First, to obtain information on RIK, I search 
through related filings on SEC Edgar database. Second, I obtain fund characteristics and return 
information from the CRSPMF database. I merge these two parts of data primarily relying on fund 
ticker and name. Since the SEC Form N-SAR provides fund name along with fund ticker since 
2006, for the accuracy of matching, my sample starts in year 2006. More details of the sample and 
variables constructions are in the following subsections.  
2.1 RIK exemption data 
Investment companies must file Form N-18F-1 to SEC to obtain the exemptive relief provided 
by Rule 18f-1.9 Information on which fund companies have filed for this form comes from two 
types of SEC filings. First, I search through the SEC Edgar and obtain all Form N-18f-1. Since 
year 1994 is the first year when SEC filings are available electronically through the EDGAR 
database, this process provides all the fund companies who have opted in this exemption under 
rule 18f-1 since year 1994. Second, for the fund companies who have filed for this exemption 
                                                          
9 The Form N-18F-1 has a standard format: https://www.sec.gov/files/formn-18f-1.pdf.  
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before 1994, I take a different approach. Redemptions related information are required to be 
disclosed in fund prospectus and statement of additional information. Thus, I search through 485 
filings on SEC Edgar for these fund companies. In the filling, if a fund company discloses 
information such as, 1) the fund has elected to be governed by Rule 18f-1, or 2) the fund is 
obligated to redeem its shares solely in cash up to the lesser of $250,000 or 1% of its NAV during 
any 90-day period, I mark the fund company as having elected to be governed by Rule 18f-1 before 
year 1994, otherwise not.  
Examples of disclosures on RIK in the prospectus are as follows. Sentinel Group Funds, Inc. 
files Form N-18f-1 on the 10th of October, 2008. In its 2009 March prospectus, Sentinel Group 
Funds, Inc. writes “shares normally will be redeemed for cash upon receipt of a request in proper 
form, although each of the Funds retain the right to redeem some or all of its shares in-kind under 
unusual circumstances, in order to protect the interest of remaining shareholders, by delivery of 
securities selected from the Fund’s assets at its discretion… The Funds have elected, however, to 
be governed by Rule 18f-1 under the Investment Company Act so that each Fund is obligated to 
redeem its shares solely in cash up to the lesser of $250,000 or 1% of its net asset value during any 
90-day period for any one shareholder of the Fund.” Furthermore, in its 2008 prospectus, there is 
no disclosure about RIK. Another example is from Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund Inc. In their 2011 
February prospectus, it writes “under circumstances in which it is deemed detrimental to the best 
interests of the Fund’s shareholders to make redemption payments wholly in cash, the Fund may 
pay any portion of a redemption in excess of the lesser of $250,000 or 1% of the Fund’s net assets 
by a distribution in kind of readily marketable securities in lieu of cash.” 
2.2 Mutual fund sample and variables construction 
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I construct my sample of actively managed equity mutual funds from the CRSPMF database 
over the years from 2006 to 2015. Following Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010), I include 
international equity funds in my sample to add more diversity in liquidity. Mutual fund data are at 
share class level. I aggregate variables, such as return, fees, turnover ratio to the fund level by 
value-weighting based on share class total net asset (TNA). I calculate fund level TNA as the sum 
of the share classes’ TNA. Fund age is the age of the longest existing share class. Fund style is the 
style of the largest share class. A fund is considered as a load fund if any of its share classes has a 
front- or end-load at a given point of time. A fund is considered as an institutional-oriented fund 
when 75% of a fund’s assets are in institutional share classes. At the share class level, CRSPMF 
assigns each fund share a dummy for institutional share and a dummy for retail share. The two 
dummies, however, are not mutually exclusive. Following Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010), I 
consider a share class to be an institutional share class if the CRSPMF institutional share dummy 
is one and the CRSPMF retail share dummy is zero.  
A fund is defined as an equity fund if it is categorized as an equity fund by the CRSPMF style 
code10 (CRSPMF style code starting with letter “E”) for more than 90% of the time throughout the 
sample period. I exclude index funds using the index flag provided in the database as well as by 
searching for the word “index” in the fund name. I further exclude fund-month observations with 
TNA less than $5million, as in Fama and French (2010), to mitigate incubation bias (Evans, 2010).  
Fund flows are estimated as the net three-month flows for each fund using its corresponding 
return and TNA as follows: 
, , 3 ,
,
, 3
(1 Re )i t i t i t
i t
i t
TNA TNA t
Flow
TNA
−
−
− +
=  
                                                          
10 Information on CRSPMF Style Code can be found at http://www.crsp.com/products/documentation/crsp-style-code.  
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Where t denotes the month and i denotes the fund. To measure fund performance, I estimate 
monthly out-of-sample alphas from different multi-factor models using the past 24-month net-of-
fee returns. Specifically, I use the CAPM model, Fama and French 3-factor model, and the Carhart 
4-factor model. Then quarterly performance is the compounded three-month alphas.  
Following Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010), I create a dummy variable Illiquid to capture the 
illiquidity of a fund’s underlying assets using CRSPMF Standard & Poor’s style code. Specifically, 
Illiquid equals one if these codes indicate that the fund invests primarily in one of the following 
categories: micro-cap equities (domestic or international), small-cap equities (domestic or 
international), mid-cap equities (domestic or international), or single-country assets excluding US, 
UK, Japan, and Canada. This definition has the advantage that it captures a fund feature which is 
transparent to all investors. Besides, this measure is exogenous to fund flows because this is the 
stated objective at the inception of the fund.  
Finally, mutual fund portfolio holdings data comes from Thomson Reuters S12 database. I 
merge the CRSP mutual fund database with the Thomson Reuters holdings database using 
MFLINKS file based on Wermers (2000) and available through the Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS). I clean up the dataset following Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008). I also 
exclude funds when <75% of the underlying securities are matched to the CRSP database.  
2.3 Data items collected from Form N-SAR and matching with the CRSPMF database  
Registered investment companies are required by the SEC to file the Form N-SAR twice a year. 
Using a python program, I obtain various important information from the N-SAR form and 
construct the following variables. First, I obtain basic filing information including Central Index 
Key (CIK), fund series name, fund series ticker, and filing date. Second, I obtain funds’ constraints 
on the use of borrowing from Question 70 (see Almazan et al., 2004 for more details on the 
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discussion of restrictions) and the actual use of overdraft or bank loan from Question 55. Questions 
55A and 55B asks whether a fund borrows in excess of 1% of their assets either through an 
overdraft or a bank loan during the reporting period, respectively. Third, I obtain end-of-filing 
period TNA (Question 74T) for all funds (including equity, bond, and balanced funds) in the 
investment company to compute family size. The identifiers for equity, bond, and balanced funds 
are from Questions 62A, 66A, and 67. Using this information, I further compute the percentage of 
company assets in equity funds and the percentage of number of equity funds in the investment 
company.    
To merge the data extracted from the SEC Edgar database and the CRSPMF database, I first 
use the ticker-year information from NSAR filings and the CRSPMF database to obtain a matched 
sample. After that, I verify each matched pair by comparing end-of-filing period TNA to the TNA 
reported in the CRSPMF database using the following two steps. First, I keep the match where the 
difference between these two TNAs to be less than 1% for any given point of time. Second, I 
require the correlation between the two time-series of TNAs for a given fund to be greater than 
98%. The final matched sample yields a total of 2966 equity funds. The Appendix Table A.1 
provides comparisons between the matched sample and the CRSPMF-only sample by year. The 
average matching rate from 2006 to 2015 is 80%, which is comparable to the rate reported in the 
Table A.1 of Natter, Rohleder, Schulte, and Wilkens (2016) for the same period. Furthermore, the 
table shows there is no significant deviations of the matched CRSPMF/NSAR sample from the 
CRSPMF-only sample with respect to fund major characteristics.  
2.4 Other data 
Stock return and trading information is obtained from the CRSP monthly stock file. To address 
potential microstructure issues, I exclude all stocks whose price is below five dollars a share. At 
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the stock level, I use the Amihud illiquidity measure developed in Amihud (2002) to capture the 
underlying stock’s liquidity. In addition, I obtain firm-level accounting data and short interest data 
from Compustat and I match this data to financial market data from CRSP using the 
CRSP/Compustat merge file. I calculate book equity as the total shareholder equity minus the book 
value of preferred stock plus the book value of deferred taxes and investment tax credit.  
2.5 Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the sample. To mitigate the influence of outliers, all 
variables, except dummy variables, are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Panel A provides 
information on the distribution of funds with and without exemption for RIK under Rule 18f-1. 
Among the 2966 funds in the sample, 2087 (70%) funds have this exemption starting from the 
beginning of the sample period 2006, 759 (26%) funds don’t have this exemption throughout the 
sample period from 2006 and 2015, and the rest 120 (4%) funds filed for the exemption during the 
sample period from 2006 and 2015. Panel B provides summary statistics for fund-month 
observations from 2006 to 2015. The definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix Table 
A.2. Fund-month wise, 71.7% of observations are from funds with exemption for RIK. The 
average investment company size is $14,182 million, with a median of $5,296 million. The 
percentage of equity funds in the company is 84.7% measured in dollar term or 86% measured in 
number of funds. Furthermore, the majority of funds is allowed to borrow externally (86.3%) or 
investing in restricted securities (94.5%). The actual utilization of overdraft or bank loan is 28.8%. 
Other variables such as fund flows, expense ratio, turnover ratio, illiquid fund, and institutional-
oriented fund are similar in magnitude to those reported in the extant literature.  
3. Characteristics associated with funds filling for the exemption of RIK 
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I start to examine the incentives with having RIK as an option to manage funds’ liquidity risk 
and the relations between RIK and other liquidity management tools. It is reasonable to assume 
that the decisions on liquidity management, including how many means to utilize and which ones, 
are determined jointly. Therefore, I model the choices of having different liquidity management 
tools simultaneously and account for the correlations in the residuals under a SUR approach. For 
liquidity management tools, I include RIK, along with two alternative types of liquidity 
management, holding cash and borrowing externally.  
For explanatory variables, I consider both asset liquidity and fund characteristics that have 
been shown to be associated with level of liquidity management in the literature. Previous studies 
(Edelen, 1999; Johnson, 2004; Alexander, Cici, and Gibson, 2007; and Coval and Stafford, 2007) 
document that, substantial redemptions requests can affect fund trading going forward, which are 
costly to remaining shareholders. Costs include explicit transaction costs such as commissions and 
bid-ask spread or implicit costs including price impacts and deviations from desired portfolios. 
These costs are especially large if funds hold illiquid securities that are critical to a fund’s 
investment strategy. Later, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010) and Goldstein, Jiang, and Ng (2017) 
show that funds holding more illiquid asset are subject to stronger complementarities among 
investors due to above reasons. Therefore, illiquid funds have a greater need for liquidity 
management. Specifically, I consider asset liquidity at both the investment company and fund 
levels. At the investment company level, I measure the overall asset liquidity using percentage of 
number of equity funds within a company (% equity funds). At the fund level, following Chen, 
Goldstein, and Jiang (2010), I construct a dummy variable Illiquid to capture the illiquidity of a 
fund’s underlying assets using the CRSPMF Standard & Poor’s style code. Specifically, Illiquid 
equals one if these codes indicate that the fund invests primarily in one of the following categories: 
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micro-cap, small-cap, mid-cap equities (domestic or international), or single-country assets 
excluding US, UK, Japan, and Canada. For fund characteristics, I include investment company 
size, fund size, load fees, standard deviation of flows, turnover ratio, expense ratio, fund age, and 
institutional-oriented funds. 
Since some of the variables are constructed using information from the Form N-SAR, which 
is at semi-annual frequency, I conduct this analysis with fund-semi-annual observations to avoid 
repeating the same value multiple times. Specifically, using SUR approach, I estimate the 
following system of equations and allow correlations in the residuals:  
1 1 1 1
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2 2 2 2
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3 3 3 3
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Overdraft or bankloan Illi
     
    
    
 
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= + + + +
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= + 4 4,i t i tquid FundChars  + + +
     (1) 
where ,i tRIK  is an indicator variable that equals to one if the fund i’s investment company has 
filed for the exemption before the semi-annual period ending at time t, and zero otherwise; % cash 
is the percentage of cash holdings of a fund;  Borrow permission  captures the ex-ante permission 
of borrowing, which takes a value of one if a fund is allowed to borrow, and zero otherwise; 
Overdraft or bank loan, captures the ex-post borrowing behavior, which takes a value of one if a 
fund has overdrafts or bank loans outstanding that exceeds a 1% of net assets at any one time 
during the reporting period on a Form N-SAR, and zero otherwise; %  equity funds  and the Illiquid 
dummy are defined previously; FundChars include investment company size measured as the 
natural logarithm of total TNA of all underlying funds (InvstCom size), the natural logarithm of 
fund size (Fund size), front- and end-load fees (Load), that equals to one if a fund has either front- 
or end-load fees, standard deviations of the past six-month flows (StdFlow), turnover ratio 
(Turnover), expense ratio (Expense), age in log (age), and a dummy variable Inst equals to one if 
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the fund is institutional-oriented. Among these variables, except that the correlations between the 
size variables are over 50%, all other pairwise correlations are moderate. I further include year 
dummies in the estimation and standard errors are clustered at the fund level.    
Results are reported in Table 2. Columns (1) to (4) are without fund characteristics, and 
columns (5) to (8) are with fund characteristics. For regression systems both with and without 
control variables, we reject the null hypothesis that the regressions’ residuals are uncorrelated. The 
Breusch-Pagan test statistic (chi-square) is 738 for without controls and 713 for with controls, both 
with a p-value less than 0.001. This finding provides supporting evidence that the choices of 
liquidity management tools are not independent from each other. Instead, they are determined 
jointly. The pair correlations in the residuals are reported at the end of this table, which reflect the 
correlations in the choices of different liquidity management tools after accounting for the part 
explained by observed characteristics used in this equation system (1). The positive correlations 
in the residuals between the RIK regression and the use of cash and external borrowing from bank 
suggests that there are complementary relations between these different liquidity management 
tools. Alternatively, for funds who are more likely to use cash and/or external borrowings, they 
are also more likely to use RIK to manage liquidity. We also observe a strong negative relation 
between the use of cash and borrowing from bank, which is consistent with the view that cash is 
considered as negative debt. 
The negative estimated coefficients on % equity funds show that fund companies with a lower 
percentage of equity funds are associated with a greater propensity of filing for the exemption.   
Alternatively, fund companies are more likely to obtain the flexibility in applying RIK when there 
are more illiquid funds managed by the company. A one standard deviation (0.186) increase in 
the % equity funds is associated with 179 ( ̶ 0.096 x 0.186) to 204 ( ̶ 0.110 x 0.186) basis points  
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decrease in the probability of funds’ filling for the RIK exemption. This implies a 2.5% to 2.85% 
decrease in the unconditional probability of filling for the exemption (71.7%). Furthermore, the 
positive estimated coefficients on Illiquid in columns (1) and (5) show that illiquid funds are more 
likely to have RIK as an option to manage liquidity shocks. Being an illiquid funds increases the 
probability of filling for RIK exemption by 640 to 750 basis points, which implies an 8.9% to 10.5% 
increase in the unconditional probability of filing for RIK exemption at the mean (71.7%). Both 
observations are consistent with the view that asset liquidity is a driving factor for the potential 
use of RIK. 
If we look at the estimated coefficients across different liquidity management variables, we 
observe that there are some common fund characteristics that determine the use of different 
liquidity management tools. Funds with more volatile flows are more likely to apply for RIK 
exemption as well as borrowing externally. Younger funds are more likely to apply for RIK 
exemption and hold more cash. This is consistent with the view in Chevalier and Ellison (1999) 
that less reputable funds experience a stronger flow to poor performance sensitivity. Furthermore, 
funds charging higher expense ratios are more likely to apply for RIK exemption, hold more cash, 
and borrow externally. Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2018) argues that, in the equilibrium, funds 
charging higher expense ratios are less liquid and conduct more exotic strategies. On the other 
hand, we also observe some differences in the set of variables that determines the use of a particular 
liquidity management tool. For example, institutional-oriented funds are more likely to borrow 
externally. Funds charging load fees are more likely to apply for RIK exemption, while hold less 
cash. These observations suggest that there are some common features of the fund, such as asset 
illiquidity, exotic fund strategy, and/or less predictable capital flows, that drive the use of all types 
of liquidity management tools. At the same time, each individual liquidity management tool has 
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its unique feature so that different type of funds chooses to have/utilize a different combination of 
liquidity management tools. 
For robustness, I also model the choices of RIK in a reduced form with logit estimation, where 
the depend variable is RIK, an indicator variable that equals to one if the fund i’s investment 
company has filed for the exemption. Instead of modelling the alternative liquidity management 
tools simultaneously, I include them in the list of explanatory variables. Appendix Table A.3 
presents the results with odds ratio reported. We continue to observe that percent of equity funds 
is negatively related to the propensity of using RIK and illiquid funds is positively related to the 
propensity of using RIK. Coming to the alternative liquidity management measures, I find that 
percentage of cash holdings and the actual use of overdraft or bank loan are statistically positively 
correlated with the propensity of filing for the exemption. These results complement with the 
findings using the SUR approach.  
4. Consequences of RIK 
4.1 Effect of RIK on investors’ capital allocation behavior 
In this section, I explore how filing for the exemption affects investors’ capital allocation 
behavior. On one hand, the increased likelihood of RIK lowers investors’ incentive to run on the 
fund by reducing the negative externalities associated with fire sales on non-redeeming investors. 
On the other hand, investors investing in mutual funds generally are not willing to take stock shares 
over cash, especially when the basket of shares received is at the manager’s discretion.  
How do both sides of effects affect investors’ purchase and redemption behavior? I take a 
revealed preference approach by comparing the flow-performance sensitivity for the funds who 
have filed for the exemption with that for funds have not. Specifically, I estimate the following 
Difference-in-Differences (DiD) regression: 
19 
 
, 1, 3 1 2 , 2, 3 , 2, , 2 , , 1i t t i t t i t t i t i s t i tFlow Perf Perf RIK Controls      + + − − − += + +  + + + +  (2) 
where  , 1, 3i t tFlow + +  is the three-month net flow in fund i from month t+1 to t+3, , 2,i t tPerf −  is the 
three-month performance, measured in either CAPM alpha, Fama-French 3-factor (FF3) alpha, or 
Carhart 4-factor (Carhart4) alpha, of fund i from month t-2 to t; 11 , 2i tRIK −  is whether the fund i 
has filed for exemption before month t-2, and , 1, , 2i t t i tPerf RIK− −  is the interaction term between 
the performance measure and the RIK dummy. Controls include fund’s filing status as a standalone 
variable (RIK), and all the control variables used in the determinants model in equation (1). Besides, 
to allow for the possibility that alternative liquidity management tools affect the flow-performance 
sensitivity, I include all the three variables, % cash, Borrow permission, and Overdraft or bank 
loan, as well as the interaction terms between these variables and the performance measure in the 
regression. Furthermore, prior research (James and Karceski, 2006; Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 
2010; Evans and Fahlenbrach, 2012) document that investor clienteles and asset liquidity have 
impacts on the flow-performance sensitivity. I allow for these effects by including the interaction 
terms between performance and the Inst dummy variable and the Illiquid dummy variable.  I also 
control for fund fixed effects, i , to account for any time-invariant fund characteristics. In order to 
control for the commonality in the flow into and out of a certain style at a given point of time 
shown in Nanda and Wei (2018), I include style×year fixed effects, ,s t , in the regression. Standard 
errors are adjusted for within-cluster correlations at the fund level.  
Results are reported in Table 3. Columns (1) to (3) use the full sample. Columns (4) to (6) use 
the sample of observations with negative performance to learn investors’ redemption decision and 
                                                          
11 These alphas are calculated using net-of-fee returns. My results are qualitatively similar when using alphas estimated 
with gross returns. Following Fama and French (2010) and Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015), monthly gross 
returns are monthly net returns plus 1/12th of annual expense ratio.  
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columns (7) to (9) use the sample of observations with positive performance to learn investors’ 
purchase decision. The significantly positive coefficients on the performance measures show that 
fund flows are highly responsive to past performance, a relation well documented in prior literature. 
Also consistent with Berk and van Binsbergen (2016) and Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016), 
investors seem to respond more strongly to CAPM alpha comparing to other multi-factor alphas.  
The focus of my analysis is the coefficient for the interaction term between performance 
measures and RIK. In the full sample, results show that all coefficient estimates are negative, and 
statistically significant for the specification with CAPM alpha and FF3 alpha. Using the CAPM 
alpha as an example, the economic magnitude of decreased flow-performance sensitivity is about 
16.7% (0.054/0.324). To infer investors’ redemption and purchase decisions separately, I create 
subsamples of observations with negative performance and positive performance respectively. I 
find that the reduction in flow-performance sensitivity mainly comes from the positive 
performance regime. This finding suggests that investors are less sensitive to good performance in 
funds with the RIK exemption. Alternatively, when investors make decisions on which funds to 
invest in, investors seem to reward funds’ good performance less when the fund has RIK 
exemption.   
Given that fund managers tend to maximize the fund size, this reduced sensitivity in flow to 
good performance indicates a cost to the fund with RIK exemption. Then where does the benefit 
come from? Next, I look into subsamples where I expect the benefits of having RIK to be greater. 
Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010) show that investors are more sensitive to poor performance in 
illiquid funds because redemptions from funds investing in comparatively more illiquid assets have 
stronger negative externalities on other investors comparing to funds investing in more liquid 
assets. The positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term between Perf and Illiquid in 
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Table 3 is consistent with this view. Since the potential benefit of mitigating fund run is greater in 
the illiquid fund sample compared to in the liquid fund sample, I investigate the effect of RIK in 
subsamples of illiquid funds and liquid funds.  
Results are reported in Table 4, with Panels A and B for the subsample of observations with 
negative performance and positive performance, respectively. In each panel, Columns (1) to (3) 
are for illiquid funds and Columns (4) to (6) are for liquid funds. All control variables used in 
Table 3 are included in the estimation, but not reported in the table for brevity. In Panel A, we 
observe that the reduced sensitivity of flow to poor performance exists in the subsample of illiquid 
funds. Using CAPM alpha as an example, the estimated coefficient for performance is 0.388 and 
that for the interaction term between the performance and RIK is  ̶ 0.093. This reduction in flow-
performance sensitivity is 24.0% (0.093/0.388), which is economically meaningful. For the 
subsample of liquid funds, the estimated coefficients on the interaction term are positive, although 
only significant at 10% level for the specification using Carhart4 alpha.  
In Panel B, we observe that all estimated coefficients for the interaction term between the 
performance and RIK are negative, which confirms the findings in Table 3 that the increased 
likelihood of RIK reduces investors’ sensitivity to good performance. Using CAPM alpha as an 
illustration for the subsample of liquid funds, the estimated coefficient for performance is 0.457 
and that for the interaction term is   ̶ 0.146. This implies a reduction of 31.9% (0.146/0.457) in 
flow to good performance sensitivity for liquid funds. Although it is more statistically significant 
in the subsample of liquid funds, the estimated coefficients on the interaction term between Perf 
and RIK don’t differ to an economically significance between the subsample of illiquid and liquid 
funds.     
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Given that the RIK funds and non-RIK funds might be systematically different as shown in the 
previous section, I adopt a matched sample approach to provide additional evidence on the 
implications of the RIK on funds’ flow-performance sensitivity. I rely on recent advances in 
matching technique and use an entropy balanced sample of treatment and control funds. Entropy 
balancing is a reweighting technique that represents a generalization of the traditional propensity 
score matching to achieve significantly improved matching between the treatment and control 
samples (Hainmueller, 2012; Agarwal, Vashishtha, and Venkatachalam, 2018). Unlike the 
propensity score matching where a control fund is assigned a weight equal to either one or zero, 
the entropy balancing approach assigns a continuous set of weights to control funds. Therefore, it 
creates a set of control counterfactuals that match more closely to the treatment funds. Moreover, 
the entropy balancing approach can better utilize the information in the control funds because most 
control funds are assigned nonzero weights instead of being dropped from the analysis. I report 
the results in Appendix Table A.4. In the Panel A, we observe that the matched characteristics of 
the two groups of funds are almost the same statistically, suggesting a good match. Panel B and 
Panel C report results for flow-performance sensitivities in the overall sample and in the 
subsamples of liquid and illiquid funds. We continue to find that funds’ flow-performance 
sensitivity is reduced when the fund performs poorly in the sample of illiquid funds. Furthermore, 
funds’ flow-performance sensitivity is reduced when the fund performs well.  
Taken together, the results in the flow-performance analysis part suggest that the effects of 
increased likelihood of RIK are twofold. First, having RIK reduces investor’s sensitivity to poor 
performance for illiquid funds. This finding suggests that investors perceive RIK as an effective 
way for illiquid funds to manage liquidity when the fund performs poorly. Second, having RIK 
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also reduces investor’s sensitivity to good performance. This finding suggests that when investors 
make decisions on which funds to invest in, they show some concerns with funds having RIK.  
4.2 Effect of RIK on price pressure of underlying assets 
In the last section, I investigate investor’s capital allocation behavior for funds with and 
without exemptions for RIK. One assumption is that, by delivering underlying assets to redeeming 
investors rather than selling those assets in the market, RIK helps mitigate asset fire sales. One 
observable outcome of asset fire sale in mutual funds, documented in Coval and Stafford (2007), 
is the downward price pressure on the underlying stocks held by the funds faced with large outflow. 
Thus, in this section, I examine the effect of RIK on the price pressure of underlying assets held 
by funds under a potential fire sale condition.  
To construct the price pressure measure induced by mutual fund fire sales, Coval and Stafford 
(2007) uses actual sales conditional on large investor outflows. However, there is a concern that, 
even facing liquidity shocks, managers could still strategically sell off assets based on the 
information they have. Thus, the asset fire sale that we try to capture from liquidity shocks could 
be contaminated by the information in the actual selling behavior (Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 
2012; Huang, Ringgenberg, and Zhang, 2016; Agarwal and Zhao, 2017, 2018). Edmans, Goldstein, 
and Jiang (2012) proposes a method to alleviate this concern by constructing hypothetical sales 
proportionate to the previously disclosed portfolios. Therefore, the flow pressure constructed does 
not reflect funds’ discretionary trades possibly related to information with the underlying asset. 
Specifically, following their methodology and using data from Thomson Reuters S12 database, I 
construct the flow-induced pressure at the stock-quarter level in the following way: 
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where ,k tMFFlow  is the pressure measure induced by mutual fund flows on stock k in quarter t, 
,i tF  is the absolute value of dollar outflow for fund i in quarter t, 
, , 1 , 1
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− −
−

 is the 
fund’s ownership of the stock as a percentage of fund total asset at the beginning of the quarter, 
and ,k tVol  is the dollar trading volume of the stock during the quarter. The summation is only over 
funds j for which outflow is equal to or larger than 5%. Since this analysis uses funds’ holdings 
and involves stocks trading information, the sample narrows down to US stocks.   
To separate the pressure induced by funds with RIK and without, following Agarwal and Zhao 
(2018), I further decompose MFFlow into the following two components: 
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where ,j tRIK  is an indicator variable equals to one if fund j has applied for the exemption for RIK 
under the rule 18f-1 before quarter t, and zero otherwise. Thus, the sum of these two mutual fund 
pressure measures for funds with and without RIK equals to the total fund pressure measure 
MFFlow.  
To measure the price pressure induced by mutual fund flows over the same quarter, I estimate 
the following regressions:  
, 1 2 , 3 , ,_ _k t k t k t t k tCAR MFFlow RIK MFFlow noRIK    = + + + +  (5) 
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where ,k tCar  is the quarterly cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of stock k in quarter t. I use three 
different approaches to estimate the CAR. First, as in Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), CAR 
is calculated over the benchmark of the CRSP equal-weighted index. Second, following Agarwal 
and Zhao (2018), I use daily stock returns data within the quarter and obtain CAPM alpha, FF3 
alpha, and Carhart4 alpha to compute for the CAR. I further control for quarterly fixed effect, t , 
in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level.  
Table 5 presents the results. We observe that the estimated coefficients on the two decomposed 
fund pressure measures are both significantly negative, suggesting a negative price pressure on the 
underlying stocks from both types of funds. However, all the estimated coefficients of 
MFFlow_RIK are smaller than those of MFFlow_noRIK, suggesting price pressure per unit from 
funds with RIK is smaller comparing to that from funds without RIK. Formal tests to compare 
each pair of these coefficients are conducted and p-values are reported in the last row of the table. 
All the differences between the two coefficients of MFFlow_RIK and MFFlow_noRIK are 
statistically different, which confirms that the price pressure induced by funds with RIK is smaller 
than that induced by funds without. These findings support the argument that RIK helps reduce 
the selling pressure on stocks caused by extreme investor redemptions.  
4.3 Performance-outflow analysis 
Investors’ incentive to run on a fund comes from the fact that outflow negatively affects fund 
returns. In this section, I test whether RIK helps mitigating the need to run by reducing the negative 
relation between performance and outflow. Specifically, I compare the impact of outflows on fund 
returns in funds with RIK to funds without by estimating the following regression: 
, , 2 1 2 , , 2 3 , , 2 , , ,i t t i t t i t t i t i s t i tPerf Outflow Outflow RIK Controls      + + += + +  + + + +  (6) 
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where , , 2i t tPerf +  is fund i’s performance in the three months from month t to t+2, measured by 
CAPM alpha, FF3 alpha, and Carhart4 alpha, , , 2i t tOutflow + is an indicator variable for whether the 
net flow is lower than  ̶ 5% of total NAV.12 Controls include a set of variables that are related to 
fund performance, lagged performance measures, natural logarithm of fund size, expense ratio, 
turnover ratio, natural logarithm of age in months, and a dummy variable for intuitional-oriented 
funds. Fund fixed effects and style×year fixed effects are included in the regression and standard 
errors are adjusted for within-cluster correlations at the fund level.  
Table 6 presents the results. First, we observe that large outflows are indeed associated with 
lower contemporaneous performance using all three different measures. This indicates that large 
outflows are disturbing to funds’ operations and detrimental to funds’ performance. What I focus 
on is the interaction term between the Outflow and the RIK variable. The positive estimated 
coefficients show that, conditional on the same level of outflow, performance of funds with higher 
likelihoods of RIK is better than that of other funds. This positive effect is statistically significant 
for the specification using CAPM alpha. Economically, given a large outflow, funds with the 
flexibility of utilizing RIK are better off, in terms of performance, by 19.2% (0.0015/0.0078) 
measured by CAPM alpha. Since the estimated coefficients on this interaction term are not 
statistically significant for the specifications using FF3 alpha or Carhart4 alpha, these results 
provide weak support for the argument that RIK helps improve fund performance when facing 
large outflows. This finding complements the findings in the price pressure analysis from the 
previous section. Conditional on a large outflow, funds who are more likely to use RIK can 
mitigate asset fire sales by directly delivering portfolio stocks to redeeming investors, which could 
                                                          
12 The results are similar when outflow is constructed in a relative way. Specifically, outflow is one when the fund 
flow is less than the 25th percentile of flows in a sample of funds from the same style and in the same quarter.   
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result in a better performance and reduce the negative externalities on the other investors who stay 
in the fund.  
5. Analysis of RIK utilization  
Results so far are ex-ante analysis examining the effects of a higher likelihood of implementing 
RIK on funds’ flow-performance sensitivity, performance-outflow relation, and asset fire sale 
effect. This section, in turn, investigates actual utilization of RIK events to provide further insights 
on how often, when, and how RIK is utilized by funds.13  I first provide information on the 
frequency and magnitude of RIK events. Then I investigate what types of securities are used to 
deliver in RIK.   
5.1 Data collection and descriptive statistics 
The SEC does not provide a guideline on the disclosure of actual utilization of RIK. I search 
through SEC filings and find that funds disclose the actual use of RIK in the footnote of their 
annual/semi-annual financial statements on Form N-CSR and Form N-CSRS. To systematically 
identify RIK events, I use a two-step process. First, a Python program is used to search through 
these two types of forms for all funds in my sample and to look for keyword strings “in kind”, “in-
kind”, or “redemptions in securities”. Second, if a filing contains any of these keywords, I 
manually go through the filling and collect information on the RIK activities. For RIK, different 
fund companies report different information. Most commonly reported information includes RIK 
total amount for the past six-month or the past year, and the realized gain or loss associated with 
these RIK transactions. Very occasionally, funds disclose the transaction party and date. I exclude 
those cases where the transaction is between affiliated parties or within family, or for 
                                                          
13 Chernenko and Sunderam (2016) provides some analysis on the ex-post use of redemptions in kind. They select 50 
fund-quarter observations with large outflows and search in the SEC filings for information related to the use of 
redemptions in kind. They find that 3 fund-quarter has in-kind redemptions, where the combined net outflows 
accumulate to $123.3 billion and $7.7 billion (6%) of the net outflows were redeemed in-kind.  
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reorganization or liquidation purposes if such information is disclosed by the fund. I conduct this 
analysis for filings with filing dates between year 2004 and 2012. This sample covers three years 
before the financial crisis (2004-2006), three years during the financial crisis (2007-2009), and 
three years after (2010-2012). A few examples of RIK disclosures are provided in Appendix C.  
The final sample includes 713 RIK disclosures for 385 funds in the sample. This implies that 
almost 12.8% of funds in the sample has used RIK during this period (2004-2012). Among these 
713 events, 94 (13.1%) are from companies without the exemption under Rule 18f-1. This 
proportion is smaller than the percentage of fund-quarter observations with no exemptions, 28.7% 
(1-71.3%), which supports the earlier argument that filing for the exemption increases the 
likelihood of using RIK.  
Table 7, Panel A, provides information on the number of disclosures, average RIK amount, 
and total RIK amount by year. Figure 1 provides a visual view on the number of RIK disclosures 
and total RIK amount by year. We observe that year 2006 and year 2008 have the top two RIK 
disclosures in terms of number, 110 and 118 respectively. For the other years, the number of RIK 
disclosures ranges from 58 to 80. In terms of the total amount of RIK, we observe an increase from 
$4,196 million in year 2004 to $14,630 million in 2006 and remains relatively high until 2008. 
After 2008, the total amount decreases to $4,153 million in 2010 and then increase back to $13,520 
in 2012. The largest number of RIK disclosures in 2008 seems to suggest that RIKs are more likely 
to be use during time periods when the market is illiquid and with a poor prospect.  
In Table 7, Panel B, we observe the frequency of disclosures by funds. For most of funds (265), 
they only have one RIK disclosure during year 2004 to 2012. However, we have 130 funds that 
have multiple RIK disclosures during the period, with 39 of them have four and more disclosures. 
The top eight users in the sample are Sequoia Fund, T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Growth Fund, Eaton 
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Vance Tax-management Growth Fund, WilliamsBurg Government Street Equity Fund, 
WilliamsBurg Government Street Mid-Cap Fund, Schroder North American Equity Fund, and 
T.Rowe Price Equity Income Fund, and T. Rowe Price Blue Chip Growth Fund. Given that we 
observe three T. Rowe funds and two WilliamsBurg funds are on the top list, it suggests a fund 
family level fixed effect. That is, for certain fund families, RIK is more likely to be utilized across 
different funds managed under the same fund family.  
Furthermore, Panel C of Table 7 provides summary statistics on the overall sample average 
transaction amount and the realized capital gain/loss associated with RIK transactions. The mean 
and median transaction amount are $119 million and $61 million. In terms of percentage of fund’s 
TNA, they correspond to 16% and 6%. These numbers are economically large, which can bring 
non-trivial liquidity consequences for a fund if the fund didn’t deal with the redemptions with RIK. 
For capital gains/losses, we observe that most of the transactions involve stocks with accumulated 
tax gains rather than losses, 626 versus 63 cases. This provides supportive evidence that RIK might 
be used for tax management given that RIK allows funds to defer tax gain realizations. 
5.2 Does funds’ trading behavior change when utilize RIK? 
With RIK, funds directly deliver securities to redeeming shareholders rather than selling 
securities on the market for cash. One interesting question to ask is whether a fund behaves 
differently when redeem in kind versus redeem in cash? In the other words, would the fund deliver 
the same basket of securities to the redeeming shareholders as if it were selling these securities on 
the market for cash?  
A few reasons suggest that this might not be the case. The first one is related to liquidity costs. 
By selling securities on the market, a fund faces trading spread and negative price pressure which 
could adversely affect a fund’s performance. Thus, funds often take liquidity of the underlying 
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stocks into consideration when funds make decisions on which stocks to sell. There are evidence 
showing that funds tend to sell liquid holdings to meet redemption requests (Lou, 2012; Jiang, Li, 
and Wang, 2017). By avoiding liquidating stocks on the market through RIK, liquidity of the 
stocks might not be a concern to the fund. This suggests liquidity of stocks might not be 
significantly related to the trading decision. Even more, funds can deliver less liquid stocks to 
maintain a comparatively more liquid portfolio to prepare for future redemptions.  
The second one is related to fund managers’ private information on portfolio stocks. If we 
assume that fund managers have the ability predicting the future loser stocks, instead of selling 
them on the market which would reveal his/her private information and depress the stock price, 
the fund manager can deliver those stocks to the redeeming investors.   
Finally, the decision could also be influenced by the bargaining power between the fund and 
the redeeming shareholder. If the redeeming shareholder is a large institutional investor, for the 
sake of future business, the fund might deliver securities that are liquid, and/or are likely to perform 
well in the future.14  
To conduct the analysis, I use funds’ quarterly holdings data and infer their trading behavior 
by examining the change in holdings in two consecutive quarters. Since RIK disclosure is at the 
semi-annual or annual level, to obtain a more precise estimation, I try to pin down the specific 
month when the RIK was utilized by matching RIK magnitude to funds’ monthly flows. For most 
cases, there is one month during the semi-annual period that has a large outflow, which I can 
reasonably assume the RIK happened in that month.  
                                                          
14  One interesting question would be examining whether a fund treats different shareholders differently when 
implementing RIK. However, in the fund disclosure, it is not required to disclose who the redeeming shareholder is. 
What I document is an average effect of all RIK events.  
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To test whether funds’ trading behavior changes, I compare funds’ trading pattern in response 
to outflows during quarters where there were purely cash redemptions to those where there were 
RIK. Lou (2012) provides a framework to test that managers follow a proportional selling strategy 
when they receive net capital outflows. This methodology is later implemented in Berger (2017). 
Motivated by these studies, I model funds’ trading behavior in response to capital flows using the 
following panel regression:15 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐴𝑚_𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐴𝑚_𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +
𝛿4𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿5𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 < 0.   (7) 
The dependent variable, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
− 1, is the percentage trading in stock j by 
fund i in quarter t, with split adjustments. 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 is the quarterly percentage flow for fund i in 
quarter t. To focus on funds trading behavior when there are redemptions, I conduct the analysis 
in the sample of fund-quarters with net outflows. That is, when flow is negative. 𝐴𝑚_𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 
is the Amihud liquidity measure developed in Amihud (2002). To avoid the influences of trading 
happened within the quarter t on stocks’ liquidity, I use the data ends before the beginning of the 
quarter t for computation.  To capture the negative information about a stock, I follow Huang, 
Ringgengerg, and Zhang (2016) and use abnormal short interest ratio, 𝐴𝑏𝑆𝐼, which is a well-
established predictor of negative future returns. The abnormal short interest ratio is the difference 
between actual and expected short interest as in Karpoff and Lou (2010). To calculate the expected 
short interest, at the beginning of each month, each stock is assigned to one of 27 portfolios 
constructed by independently sorting stocks into terciles based on market capitalization, book-to-
                                                          
15 Results are similar when I examine the trading pattern for fund-quarters with net outflows larger than 1% or 5% of 
funds’ net asset at the beginning of the quarter.  
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market, and the prior one-year return, all measured at the end of the previous month. Then I run 
the panel regressions of the form: 
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑀𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑘 + 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 (8) 
where the dependent variable, 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡, is the short interest ratio of the firm i in month t, as the ratio 
of shares held short to the number of shares outstanding, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐵𝑀𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 , 
𝐵𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡, and 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables that equal one if firm i is 
assigned to the corresponding portfolio, and 𝛾𝑘 represents k industry dummies defined using two-
digit SIC codes. Using abnormal short interest rather than raw short interest ratio allows me to 
identify stocks which likely had recent unexpected negative signals rather than stocks which 
always have high short interest.  
To compare the trading patterns for quarters with purely redemptions in cash and quarters with 
RIK, I separately estimate the equation (7) for the fund-quarter sample with RIK transactions and 
the sample without. For the cases where I can pin down the specific month when RIK happens, I 
code the corresponding quarter as with RIK transactions. For the other cases, where it is difficult 
to pin down the specific quarter it happened, I consider both quarters within that semi-annual 
reporting period as with RIK transactions. Given that the overall sample spans for nine years from 
2004 to 2012, during which market aggregated liquidity change quite a bit, funds might behave 
differently overtime. I breakdown the overall sample into three subsamples, 2004 to 2006, 2007 to 
2009, and 2010 to 2012, to conduct the analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level to 
allow for correlations in the trading behavior of the same fund.  
Table 8 presents the results, with Panel A for years 2004 to 2006, Panel B for years 2007 to 
2009, and Panel C for years 2010 to 2012. Columns (1) to (2) are for the fund-quarters without 
33 
 
RIK transactions and columns (3) to (4) are for fund-quarters with RIK transactions. To consider 
the possibility that various liquidity management tools could affect funds’ trading behavior, I 
control for percentage cash holdings, front- and end- loads, and their interactions with the flow 
variable in columns (2) and (4).  
Consistent with the findings in the literature, fund trading is highly responsive to fund flows. 
In all three panels, the estimated coefficients on the outflow variable is around 1, suggesting that 
funds trade one-for-one dollar when facing outflows. Furthermore, in the non-RIK sample, the 
estimated coefficient on the interaction term between outflow and Amihud illiquidity measure are 
negative, although not statistically significant. This is consistent with the finding in the literature 
that funds tend to sell more liquid assets when facing redemption requests. In the RIK sample 
during year 2004 to 2006, we also observe negative estimated coefficients on the interaction term 
between outflow and Amihud illiquidity measure. This finding suggests that during this period, 
funds doing RIK behave similarly as funds redeem in cash in terms of their portfolio churning 
behavior.  In contrast, in Panels B and C, we observe that, in the RIK sample, the estimated 
coefficients are consistently positive and statistically significant. This evidence indicates that, 
during years from 2007 to 2012, when fund managers utilize RIK, they tend to deliver more illiquid 
stocks. Using the estimated coefficient for 2007-2009 (8.050) to illustrate the economic magnitude, 
one standard deviation increase in the Amihud illiquidity measure leads to 0.217 increase in the 
trade-flow sensitivity. That is around a quarter of the trade flow sensitivity for very liquid stocks 
(0.833).  
These different findings in different time periods are interesting. I only find funds delivering 
more illiquid stocks during periods when the market is more illiquid and more volatile. This 
suggests that fund managers, when making decisions on what types of stocks to deliver to 
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redeeming shareholders, make a tradeoff between the welfare of the remaining investors and that 
of the redeeming ones. During periods when the market is comparatively liquid and future 
prospects look good, funds deliver stocks whose liquidity is similar to the portfolio’s liquidity or 
better so that the redeeming investors could easily turn these securities into cash. At the same time, 
such behavior shall not affect the remaining investors much as the market liquidity is good for 
funds to rebalance its portfolio in the future. In contrast, during periods when the market is more 
illiquid and the future is less certain, funds using RIK to deal with large outflows tend to deliver 
more illiquid securities as a way to cash out on these illiquid assets without moving the market 
prices and also to maintain a more liquid portfolio to prepare for future redemptions. Such behavior 
might potentially affect redeeming investors as when they go to sell the securities on the market, 
they might incur large transaction costs including market impact costs. However, funds’ current 
and future prospects during such a difficult time might be a bigger concern for fund managers.   
Next, going to the hypothesis that funds might deliver stocks with potential poor future 
performance, I do not find any evidence suggesting that fund managers choose stocks based on 
their private information of stocks’ performance in the future. All the estimated coefficients on the 
interaction term between the flow variable and the abnormal short interest variable are statistically 
insignificant throughout Panels A to C.    
One can argue that the relative illiquidity and underperformance of a stock in the overall 
portfolio, rather than the absolute levels, matter in managers’ decisions. To entertain this 
possibility, I further conduct the analysis using adjusted illiquidity and abnormal return measures. 
Specifically, for the illiquidity measure, I subtract the median illiquidity of the stocks held by the 
fund each quarter. Similarly, I adjust for the abnormal short interest measure. Results are reported 
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in Appendix Table A.5. The estimated coefficients are fairly similar to the ones without 
adjustments, thus leading us to draw quantitatively the same conclusions.  
5.3 Flow-performance analysis using RIK utilization data 
With the information on which funds have actually used RIK, I repeat the flow-performance 
analysis in Section 4.1. Specifically, I compare funds that have used RIK with funds without RIK 
exemption and redo the analysis for illiquid funds and liquid funds. Results are reported in 
Appendix Table A.6. We observe that, for illiquid funds, the sensitivity of flow to poor 
performance is significantly lower for RIK users. This finding conforms the previous finding that 
RIK helps mitigate fund run behavior when funds perform poorly. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that RIK users face lower flow-performance sensitivity when funds perform well, consistent with 
the findings in Section 4.1.  
Taken together, these ex-post analyses first show that the RIK transactions happen throughout 
all years in the sample and magnitude of RIK transactions are significant to a fund. Second, 
evidence suggest that fund managers strategically pick stocks that are illiquid to deliver during 
time periods when the market is illiquid and volatile. Third, illiquid funds that actually use RIK 
benefit by facing a lower flow-performance sensitivity when funds perform poorly.   
6. Conclusions and discussions 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the motivations and consequences of RIK in open-
end equity mutual funds. On one hand, RIK allows funds to avoid asset fire sales when facing 
large redemptions, thus reduces investors’ incentives to run on the fund.  On the other hand, mutual 
fund investors seeking liquidity often are not willing to take shares instead of cash from the fund. 
This problem is exacerbated when fund managers have the discretion over which securities to 
deliver in RIK.   
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By modelling the choices of various liquidity management tools simultaneously, I find that 
asset illiquidity is positively correlated with the likelihood of using RIK and that RIK complements 
cash holdings and borrowing in managing funds’ liquidity risk. I further document a few 
consequences of increased likelihood of utilizing RIK. First, investors are less sensitive to poor 
performance in the subsample of illiquid funds that are more likely to use RIK, suggesting that 
RIK helps mitigate investors’ run-like behavior. However, investors’ flows are also less sensitive 
to good performance of funds with increased likelihood of using RIK, providing evidence on the 
existence of costs associated with RIK. Second, conditional on a large outflow, RIK helps reduce 
the flow-induced price pressure on stocks held by funds with a higher likelihood of using RIK. 
Third, there is some evidence that RIK improves fund performance conditional on a large outflow. 
Finally, funds utilize RIK in significantly large transactions across all years in the sample period 
that include different market conditions. Evidence indicates that fund managers pick stocks that 
are more illiquid to deliver in RIK during periods when the market is illiquid and volatile. These 
findings together help understand the pros and cons for funds adopting the use of RIK, one of the 
liquidity management tools utilized by open-end mutual funds and discussed in the recent policy 
changes.  
As we know, mutual funds have multiple tools to manage liquidity. Each of them has their 
advantages and limitations. RIK is unique in the following two aspects: 1) theoretically, the 
maximum amount of redemption shocks RIK can deal with is 100% of fund assets, and 2) RIK 
allows funds to transfer liquidation costs to the redeeming shareholders. The difficulty in 
implementing RIK is the reluctance of investors in receiving stock shares instead of cash, which 
could impose reputational costs on the fund. The other tools also come with benefits and costs. 
First, cash can be used to absorb net outflows. Since holding cash forces funds to forgo profitable 
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investment opportunities, on average, funds only hold around 3% of assets in cash in my sample. 
This amount limits funds’ ability in using cash to handle large liquidity shocks. Second, funds can 
borrow externally from banks and internally within a fund family. Borrowing comes with explicit 
borrowing costs. On top of that, maintaining the ability to borrow comes with costs. For instance, 
to maintain the line of credit at the bank, fund families need to pay commission fees. To borrow 
internally from the money market funds within the fund families, these money market funds are 
exposed to liquidity risks from the borrowing funds and therefore become riskier. Third, funds can 
potentially cross-trade between funds in the same family to help mitigate the price impact 
associated with flow-induced trading. Goncalves-Pinto and Schmidt (2013) show that this type of 
transaction is more prevalent between funds with the same fund manager. The fact that we observe 
funds simultaneously use all kinds of liquidity management tools speak to the tradeoffs discussed 
here. Funds might optimally choose among the tools when dealing with liquidity shocks depending 
on the nature of the shocks and market conditions. Such an investigation is left for future research.  
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Figure 1. Number of RIK disclosures and total RIK amount by year 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Panel A. Redemptions in kind status at fund level 
The sample contains 2,966 actively managed equity funds from 2006 to 2015. 
 # of funds % of sample 
Full sample 2966  
Funds with no exemption 759 25.6% 
Funds always with the exemption 2087 70.4% 
Funds filed the exemption between year 2006 and 2015 120 4.0% 
 
Panel B. Summary statistics at fund-month level 
The sample contains 244,218 fund-month observations from 2966 funds over 2006 to 2015. RIK is 1 if a fund has 
filed for the exemption under section 18(f)(1). Flow is quarterly net flow as a percentage of fund’s TNA at the end 
of last quarter. Fund size is total asset value of a fund in million. CAPM alpha, FF3 alpha, and Carhart4 alpha are 
quarterly alpha estimated from the CAPM model, the Fama-French three-factor model, and the four-factor model, 
respectively. Illiquid is 1 if a fund primarily invests in illiquid assets – funds specializing in small-cap, mid-cap, 
and single-country international stocks (except in UK, Canada, and Japan). Inst is 1 if at least 75% of a fund’s asset 
is issued to institutions. Expense is the expense ratio of a fund as a percentage of total assets reported in the 
CRSPMF database. Turnover is the turnover ratio of a fund reported in the CRSPMF database. % cash is percentage 
of fund assets held in cash reported in the CRSPMF database. Load is 1 if any of a fund share classes charges a 
front- or back-end load. Age is number of months since the fund’s inception. StdFlow is standard deviation of a 
fund’s monthly flow. InvstCom size is total asset value of all funds managed by an investment company in 
million. % equity funds is number of equity funds over total number of funds within an investment company. 
Borrow permission is 1 if a fund is allowed to borrow reported in question 70O on Form N-SAR. Overdraft or bank 
loan is 1 if a fund had overdrafts or bank loans outstanding that exceeded 1% of TNA at any time during the 
reporting period reported in question 55 on Form N-SAR.  
 Mean Std. Dev. 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
RIK 0.724 0.447 0 0 1 1 1 
Flow -0.189 11.723 -13.723 -4.696 -1.606 2.133 17.496 
Fund size 1539 5053 16 86 313 1111 6042 
CAPM alpha -0.004 0.042 -0.076 -0.025 -0.004 0.016 0.064 
FF3 alpha -0.006 0.040 -0.076 -0.023 -0.004 0.013 0.059 
Carhart4 alpha -0.005 0.040 -0.074 -0.023 -0.004 0.014 0.058 
Illiquid 0.295 0.456 0 0 0 1 1 
Inst 0.212 0.408 0 0 0 0 1 
Expense 0.012 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.012 0.015 0.020 
Turnover 0.792 0.757 0.110 0.310 0.590 1.000 2.100 
% cash 3.098 4.850 -0.240 0.380 1.790 3.980 11.340 
Load 0.743 0.437 0 0 1 1 1 
Age  182 140 41 97 153 220 456 
StdFlow 0.024 0.045 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.022 0.089 
Variables from Form N-SAR        
InvstCom size 14234 21755 118 1281 5327 17634 61897 
% equity funds 0.861 0.186 0.474 0.750 1 1 1 
Borrow permission 0.864 0.343 0 1 1 1 1 
Overdraft or bank loan 0.288 0.453 0 0 0 1 1 
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Table 2: Characteristics associated with different liquidity management tools using SUR approach 
 
This table presents estimation results from equation system (1), which models the choices of various liquidity management tools simultaneously using SUR 
approach. Observations are at fund-semi-annual level. RIK is an indicator variable that equals to one if the fund i’s investment company has filed for the 
exemption before time t, and zero otherwise. %Cash is the percentage of fund assets held in cash reported in the CRSPMF database. Borrow permission 
captures the ex-ante permission of borrowing, which takes a value of one if a fund is allowed to borrow, and zero otherwise; Overdraft or bank loan captures 
the ex-post borrowing behavior, which takes a value of one if a fund has overdrafts or bank loans outstanding that exceeds a 1% of net assets at any one time 
during the reporting period on a Form N-SAR, and zero otherwise. All the independent variables are defined in the Appendix Table A.2 and year dummies 
are included in all specifications. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 
10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 RIK % Cash 
Borrow 
permission 
Overdraft or 
bank loan RIK % Cash 
Borrow 
permission 
Overdraft or 
bank loan          
% equity funds  -0.096**    -0.110**    
 (-2.14)    (-2.38)             
Illiquid 0.075*** 0.243* 0.007 0.010 0.064*** 0.086 0.009 -0.012 
 (4.16) (1.87) (0.58) (0.83) (3.54) (0.63) (0.69) (-1.08) 
Fund characteristics         
InvstCom size     -0.004 -0.111*** 0.006* 0.016*** 
     (-0.80) (-2.70) (1.73) (5.01)          
Fund size     -0.008 0.164*** 0.009** -0.042*** 
     (-1.35) (3.38) (2.16) (-11.42)          
Load     0.111*** -0.349** -0.019 0.016 
     (5.35) (-2.45) (-1.37) (1.33) 
StdFlow     0.132** 0.482 0.049 0.498*** 
     (2.13) (0.62) (1.27) (7.59)          
Turnover     0.007 0.285** 0.033*** 0.059*** 
     (0.78) (2.16) (5.27) (8.21)          
Expense     0.043* 1.197*** -0.018 0.083*** 
     (1.86) (5.86) (-1.09) (5.35)          
Age     -0.039*** -0.729*** -0.014 0.003 
     (-2.88) (-7.31) (-1.45) (0.32)          
Inst     0.025 -0.104 0.005 0.071*** 
     (1.23) (-0.74) (0.40) (5.69)          
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 43,740 43,740 43,740 43,740 42,281 42,281 42,281 42,281 
R-sq 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.033 0.027 0.015 0.072          
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Breusch-Pagan test of 
independence Chi2 722 p-value 0.000 Chi2 721 p-value 0.000                  
Correlations in the residuals RIK 
 
% cash 
Borrow 
permission 
 
 
Overdraft or 
bank loan 
 
 
RIK 
 
 
% cash 
 
 
Borrow 
permission 
Overdraft or 
bank loan 
RIK 1    1    
% cash 0.0456*** 1   0.036*** 1   
Borrow permission -0.003 -0.013*** 1  0.004 -0.011** 1  
Overdraft or bank loan 0.070*** -0.085*** 0.048*** 1 0.044*** -0.108*** 0.046*** 1 
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Table 3. Effects of redemptions in kind on flow-performance sensitivities 
This table reports the estimation results of the flow-performance regressions in equation (2). Columns (1) to (3) use the full sample, columns (4) to (6) use the 
sample of observations with negative performance and columns (7) to (9) use the sample of observations with positive performance. Observations are at fund-
month level. The dependent variable is the quarterly net flow. Perf is the fund’s prior-quarter performance, measured with three variables, CAPM alpha, FF3 
alpha, and Carhart4 alpha. All the other variables are defined in Appendix Table A2. All estimations include fund and style×year fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are reported in the parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 
10% level. 
 Full sample Negative performance Positive performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 
Perf 0.324*** 0.271*** 0.233*** 0.248*** 0.225*** 0.189*** 0.432*** 0.409*** 0.299*** 
 (10.07) (8.47) (7.29) (5.28) (4.81) (4.06) (6.91) (5.88) (4.41)           
Perf x RIK -0.054** -0.042* -0.038 -0.023 -0.019 0.010 -0.117** -0.127** -0.060 
 (-2.16) (-1.71) (-1.52) (-0.68) (-0.57) (0.29) (-2.44) (-2.48) (-1.20)           
 
Control variable:          
RIK 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.007 0.007 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.19) (-0.36) (-0.29) (0.71) (1.01) (1.07)           
InvstCom size (log) 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (1.78) (1.75) (1.78) (1.99) (1.38) (1.51) (0.82) (1.55) (1.30)           
Fund size (log) -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (-17.04) (-17.04) (-16.96) (-14.95) (-15.48) (-15.21) (-12.73) (-12.57) (-12.51)           
Flow 0.242*** 0.243*** 0.244*** 0.227*** 0.233*** 0.235*** 0.243*** 0.236*** 0.243*** 
 (19.83) (19.93) (20.00) (19.79) (19.73) (20.01) (18.51) (17.73) (18.65)           
Load 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.009* 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.006 
 (1.38) (1.37) (1.32) (1.93) (1.56) (1.34) (0.86) (0.99) (1.18)           
StdFlow 0.692*** 0.693*** 0.693*** 0.551*** 0.575*** 0.583*** 0.868*** 0.856*** 0.842*** 
 (20.51) (20.53) (20.53) (13.05) (13.92) (14.25) (20.57) (19.28) (19.34)           
Turnover 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.54) (0.53) (0.48) (-1.00) (-1.41) (-0.46) (1.19) (1.48) (1.09)           
Expense 1.454*** 1.449*** 1.492*** 1.671*** 1.791*** 1.708*** 1.558** 1.370** 1.302** 
 (2.84) (2.84) (2.90) (2.88) (3.24) (3.02) (2.46) (2.17) (2.07)           
Age (log) -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.044*** -0.042*** -0.040*** -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.033*** 
 (-8.47) (-8.60) (-8.51) (-9.34) (-9.04) (-8.68) (-5.37) (-6.21) (-6.53)           
Inst 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.007 0.003 0.004 
 (2.55) (2.52) (2.55) (3.24) (3.88) (3.08) (1.60) (0.75) (0.91)           
% Cash 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 (4.71) (4.75) (4.70) (4.70) (5.32) (5.93) (2.17) (1.49) (1.58)           
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Borrow permission 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.004 
 (1.33) (1.32) (1.32) (0.93) (1.27) (1.07) (1.53) (0.72) (1.01)           
Overdraft or bank loan -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (-4.96) (-4.77) (-4.80) (-3.13) (-3.26) (-2.94) (-3.65) (-4.18) (-4.30)           
Perf x Illiquid 0.062*** 0.075*** 0.071*** 0.063** -0.008 -0.031 0.084* 0.078 0.107** 
 (2.62) (3.17) (3.03) (2.04) (-0.26) (-0.94) (1.87) (1.54) (2.17)           
Perf x Inst -0.048* -0.058** -0.043 -0.003 -0.004 -0.037 -0.127** -0.132** -0.038 
 (-1.79) (-2.11) (-1.56) (-0.07) (-0.10) (-0.83) (-2.13) (-2.06) (-0.64)           
Perf x Cash 0.007*** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.005 0.006* 0.010*** 0.004 0.005 0.006 
 (2.95) (2.58) (3.32) (1.52) (1.72) (2.98) (0.68) (0.93) (1.14)           
Perf x Borrow 
permission -0.085*** -0.053** -0.037 -0.041 -0.014 -0.002 -0.109** -0.057 -0.061 
 (-3.03) (-1.96) (-1.38) (-0.97) (-0.32) (-0.06) (-2.14) (-0.99) (-1.05)           
Perf x Overdraft or bank 
loan 0.039** 0.041** 0.037* 0.031 0.019 0.030 0.025 0.056 0.038 
 (1.98) (2.10) (1.88) (1.06) (0.61) (0.97) (0.59) (1.31) (0.92)           
Fund and Style×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 244218 244218 244218 135081 138588 136876 109137 105630 107342 
Adj. R-sq 0.201 0.199 0.198 0.156 0.167 0.167 0.229 0.220 0.219 
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Table 4. Effects of redemptions in kind on flow-performance sensitivities for subsamples  
This table reports the estimation results of the flow-performance regressions in equation (2), for subsamples of 
illiquid funds in columns (1) to (3) and liquid funds in columns (4) to (6). Panel A is for the subsample of 
observations with negative performance and Panel B is for the subsample of observations with positive 
performance. The dependent variable is the quarterly net flow. Perf is the fund’s prior-quarter performance, 
measured with three variables, CAPM alpha, FF3 alpha, and Carhart4 alpha. All the control variables are the same 
as in Table 3. All estimations include fund and style×year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund 
level and t-statistics are reported in the parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% 
level, and * at the 10% level. 
Panel A. Subsample of negative performance 
 Illiquid funds Liquid funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 
Perf 0.388*** 0.222*** 0.275*** 0.214*** 0.229*** 0.148*** 
 (5.81) (2.70) (3.66) (3.55) (4.13) (2.61)        
Perf x RIK -0.093* -0.136** -0.140** 0.010 0.021 0.071* 
 (-1.83) (-2.33) (-2.18) (0.25) (0.52) (1.80)        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund & Style x 
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 41432 40946 40364 93649 97642 96512 
Adj. R-sq 0.186 0.193 0.192 0.145 0.157 0.158 
Panel B. Subsample of positive performance 
 Illiquid funds Liquid funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 
Perf 0.478*** 0.399*** 0.263** 0.457*** 0.466*** 0.377*** 
 (4.43) (3.27) (2.17) (6.02) (5.36) (4.62)        
Perf x RIK -0.080 -0.122 -0.042 -0.146** -0.150** -0.084 
 (-1.01) (-1.22) (-0.41) (-2.44) (-2.47) (-1.49)        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund & Style x 
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 33571 34057 34639 76784 72845 73998 
Adj. R-sq 0.266 0.254 0.254 0.215 0.205 0.204 
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Table 5. Effects of redemptions in kind on price pressure 
This table reports the estimation results of the price pressure analysis in equations (5). The dependent variable is 
CAR estimated using four different measures. Columns (1) and (2) use CAR calculated using excess return over 
the CRSP equal-weighted index return, Columns (3) and (4) use CAR computed with CAPM alpha, Columns (5) 
and (6) use CAR computed with FF3 alpha, and Columns (7) and (8) use CAR computed with Carhart4 alpha. 
MFFlow_RIK is the price pressure measure for funds with the exemption filing for RIK and MFFlow_noRIK is the 
measure for funds without the exemption filing. The observations are at stock-quarter level. Standard errors are 
clustered at the stock level. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 CAR_EW CAR_CAPM CAR_FF3 CAR_Carhart4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MFFlow_RIK -0.0183*** -0.0170*** -0.0162*** -0.0164*** 
 (-23.20) (-21.11) (-20.03) (-19.83) 
MFFlow_noRIK -0.0466*** -0.0462*** -0.0380*** -0.0373*** 
 (-17.45) (-16.96) (-14.02) (-13.49) 
     
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 110418 109895 109895 109895 
Adj. R-sq 0.022 0.033 0.015 0.010 
     
Test press_inkind = Press_noinkind    
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
49 
 
Table 6. Effects of redemptions in kind on performance-outflow sensitivity 
This table reports the estimation results of performance-outflow analysis in equation (6). The dependent variable is 
quarter performance, measured by CAPM alpha in Column (1), FF3 alpha in Column (2), and Carhart4 alpha in 
Column (3). Outflow is one if the percentage outflow of a fund exceeds 5% of the fund’s TNA at the beginning. 
Number of observations is 265,236 and the observations are at fund-month level. Standard errors are clustered at 
the fund level. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 CAPM alpha FF3 alpha Carhart4 alpha 
  (1) (2) (3)     
Outflow -0.0078*** -0.0063*** -0.0059*** 
 (-10.93) (-9.57) (-9.34)     
Outflow x RIK 0.0015* 0.0009 0.0011 
 (1.78) (1.23) (1.46) 
Control variable:    
RIK -0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0013 
 (-1.02) (-0.23) (-1.13)     
Perf (lag) -0.1107*** -0.0451*** -0.1107*** 
 (-31.34) (-8.68) (-25.05)     
Fund size (log) -0.0061*** -0.0053*** -0.0057*** 
 (-22.79) (-21.84) (-22.59)     
Expense -0.0996 -0.0648 -0.1016 
 (-0.91) (-0.61) (-0.99)     
Turnover 0.0008** 0.0010*** 0.0013*** 
 (2.39) (3.01) (4.01)     
Age -0.0029*** 0.0004 -0.0005 
 (-3.41) (0.47) (-0.66)     
Inst 0.0010* 0.0008 0.0015*** 
 (1.71) (1.38) (2.77)     
Fund and Style×Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq 0.182 0.166 0.167 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics on actual RIK transactions 
The sample contains 713 RIK disclosures from 385 funds in their semi-annual and annual financial reports for the 
fiscal years ended in 2004 to 2012. Data are identified and collected from the Form N-CSR and the Form N-CSRS. 
Panel A provides the number of disclosures, the average RIK amount and total RIK amount by fiscal year, Panel B 
provides the frequency of disclosures by funds, and Panel C reports the overall sample descriptive statistics.  
Panel A. Descriptive statistics by fiscal year 
 N Average amount ($m) Total amount ($m) 
2004 63 67 4196 
2005 68 147 9996 
2006 110 133 14630 
2007 79 144 11376 
2008 118 98 11564 
2009 70 94 6601 
2010 58 72 4153 
2011 67 168 11256 
2012 80 169 13520 
Total 713   
 
Panel B. Frequency of disclosures by fund 
This panel provides information on frequency of RIK disclosures by each fund over 2004 to 2012.  
# of RIK disclosures # of funds 
1 265 
2 70 
3 21 
4 & above 39 
 
Panel C. Summary statistics 
This panel provides information on the overall sample summary statistics. RIK amount ($m) is the RIK transaction 
amount in million. RIK amount / TNA is RIK amount over funds’ TNA. RIK amount / six-month net dollar flow is 
RIK amount over funds’ six-month net dollar flow over the same reporting period. Tax gain associated with RIK 
($m) is tax gains associated with the securities delivered in RIK transaction in million.  
 N Mean Std. Dev. 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
RIK amount ($m) 546 119 171 7 17 61 142 308 
RIK amount / TNA  541 0.16 0.29 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.38 
RIK amount / six-month net dollar 
flow 546 0.99 4.43 -0.68 0.02 0.42 0.94 2.43 
Tax gains associated with RIK ($m)   689 31 67 0 1 9 37 83 
 
  
51 
 
Table 8. Funds’ portfolio churning behavior 
This table reports the estimation results of the equation (7), which examines mutual funds’ trading behavior in 
response to outflows using 13 F quarterly holdings data. Panel A reports results for year 2004 to 2006, Panel B 
reports results for years 2007 to 2009, and Panel C reports results for years 2010 to 2012. Columns (1) to (2) are 
for the quarters without RIK transactions and columns (3) to (4) are for the quarters with RIK transactions. The 
dependent variable, Trade, is the percentage trading in a stock by the fund in a quarter, with split adjustments. Flow 
is the contemporaneous net quarterly flow. Am_illiqd is the Amihud illiquidity measure developed in Amihud 
(2002). AbSI is last month abnormal short interest before the beginning of the quarter. Control variables includes % 
of cash holdings, load, and the interaction terms between flow and these two variables. Observations are at fund-
stock-quarter level. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are reported in the parentheses, 
where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
 Fund-quarters without RIK disclosures Fund-quarters with RIK disclosures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Trade Trade Trade Trade 
Panel A. Year 2004-2006 
Flow 1.125*** 1.267*** 0.946*** 1.103*** 
 (20.67) (13.19) (15.96) (11.54) 
Am_illiqd 0.251** 0.265** -0.075 -0.024 
 (2.84) (2.76) (-0.42) (-0.15) 
Flow x Am_illiqd -0.823 -0.721 -4.780 -4.018 
 (-1.08) (-0.90) (-1.47) (-1.42) 
ABSI -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (-8.88) (-9.05) (-0.18) (-0.24) 
Flow x ABSI -0.008 -0.007 0.019 0.021 
 (-1.28) (-1.17) (1.08) (1.37) 
     
Control variables No Yes No  Yes 
N 729466 722132 17868 17868 
Adj. R-sq 0.011 0.011 0.035 0.036 
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Table 8. (Continued) 
    
Panel B. Year 2007-2009     
 Fund-quarters without RIK disclosures Fund-quarters with RIK disclosures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Trade Trade Trade Trade 
Flow 0.979*** 1.058*** 0.963*** 0.833*** 
 (19.67) (13.24) (5.89) (3.86) 
Am_illiqd 0.247** 0.245** 0.991*** 0.930*** 
 (2.79) (2.86) (4.36) (4.07) 
Flow x Am_illiqd -1.767 -1.631 8.877** 8.050** 
 (-1.26) (-1.12) (2.32) (2.38) 
ABSI -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003 -0.003 
 (-6.92) (-7.02) (-0.82) (-0.79) 
Flow x ABSI -0.005 -0.004 0.008 0.010 
 (-1.01) (-0.93) (0.39) (0.54) 
     
Control variables No Yes No  Yes 
N 962920 961858 16191 16191 
Adj. R-sq 0.009 0.009 0.020 0.020 
     
Panel C. Year 2010-2012     
 Fund-quarters without RIK disclosures Fund-quarters with RIK disclosures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Trade Trade Trade Trade 
Flow 0.994*** 0.973*** 0.869*** 1.142*** 
 (22.63) (12.04) (5.35) (18.12) 
Am_illiqd 0.210*** 0.148** -0.236 -0.024 
 (4.74) (2.36) (-1.01) (-0.12) 
Flow x Am_illiqd -0.397 -0.829 6.727* 9.363** 
 (-0.69) (-1.18) (1.77) (2.49) 
ABSI -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003 -0.002 
 (-6.71) (-7.41) (-1.42) (-1.27) 
Flow x ABSI 0.002 0.002 -0.007 0.002 
 (0.54) (0.44) (-0.62) (0.20) 
     
Control variables No Yes No  Yes 
N 850411 850411 15835 15835 
Adj. R-sq 0.009 0.010 0.013 0.022 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1. Comparisons between the matched CRSP/NSAR sample and the CRSP-only sample 
 Panel A: matched CRSP/NSAR sample Panel B: CRSP-only sample 
Year 
# of 
Funds 
Average 
TNA 
Average 
return (%) 
Average 
flow (%) 
Expense 
ratio 
Turnover 
ratio 
# of 
Funds 
Average 
TNA 
Average 
return (%) 
Average 
flow (%) 
Expense 
ratio 
Turnover 
ratio 
2006 2743 1097 1.256 0.997 0.013 0.813 3322 1050 1.247 1.006 0.013 0.803 
2007 2859 1226 0.711 0.599 0.013 0.821 3427 1169 0.703 0.653 0.013 0.814 
2008 2793 1036 -3.545 -0.259 0.013 0.851 3550 980 -3.468 -0.175 0.012 0.850 
2009 2646 869 2.509 0.024 0.013 0.949 3356 820 2.458 0.067 0.013 0.948 
2010 2505 1083 1.488 -0.094 0.013 0.895 3141 1012 1.483 -0.084 0.013 0.887 
2011 2403 1241 -0.347 -0.228 0.012 0.783 3020 1166 -0.352 -0.227 0.012 0.778 
2012 2264 1285 1.251 -0.519 0.012 0.735 2825 1213 1.254 -0.485 0.012 0.730 
2013 2167 1528 2.088 0.032 0.012 0.675 2694 1441 2.071 -0.012 0.012 0.672 
2014 2068 1781 0.477 -0.271 0.012 0.659 2578 1679 0.475 -0.265 0.012 0.659 
2015 2024 1803 -0.123 -0.443 0.011 0.631 2513 1705 -0.124 -0.410 0.011 0.629 
Total 2966      3928      
Corr. 0.986 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.999 1.000       
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Table A.2. Variable definitions 
Variables are listed alphabetically.  
Variable  Unit Definition 
% cash Percent Percentage of fund assets held in cash reported in the CRSPMF database 
% equity funds Decimal Number of funds over total number of funds within an investment company 
Age Month Number of months since the fund's inception 
Borrow permission Dummy 1 if a fund is allowed to borrow reported in question 70Q on Form N-SAR 
CAPM alpha Decimal Quarterly alpha from the CAPM model 
Carhart4 alpha Decimal Quarterly alpha from the four-factor (the Fama and French three factor and the momentum factor) model 
Expense Decimal Expense of a fund as a percentage of total assets reported in the CRSPMF database 
FF3 alpha Decimal Quarterly alpha from the three-factor model 
Flow Percent Quarterly net flow as a percentage of fund's TNA at the end of last quarter 
Fund size $million Total asset value of a fund 
Illiquid  Dummy  
1 if a fund primarily invests in illiquid assets - funds specializing in small-cap, mid-cap, and single-country 
international stocks (except in UK, Canada, and Japan) 
Inst Dummy 1 if at least 75% of a fund's asset is issued to institutions 
InvstCom size $million Total asset value of all funds managed by an investment company 
Am_illiqd  The Amihud illiquidity measure developed in Amihud (2002)  
Load Dummy 1 if any of a fund share classes charges a front- or back-end load 
MFFlow Decimal Price pressure induced by mutual fund flow constructed following Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) 
MFFlow_ RIK Decimal Price pressure induced by mutual fund flow for funds with the exemption filing for RIK 
MFFlow_noRIK Decimal Price pressure induced by mutual fund flow for funds without the exemption filing for RIK 
Outflow Dummy 1 if the percentage outflow of a fund exceeds 5% of the fund's TNA at the beginning 
Overdraft or bank loan 
  
Dummy 
  
1 if a fund had overdrafts or bank loans outstanding that exceeded 1% of TNA at any time during the reporting period 
reported in question 55 on Form N-SAR 
RIK 
 
Dummy 
 
1 if a fund has filed for the exemption from certain requirements of section 18(f)(1) for registered open-end investment 
companies to redeem in kind 
Stdflow Decimal Standard deviation of a fund's monthly flow 
Turnover Decimal Turnover ratio of a fund reported in the CRSPMF database 
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Table A.3. Characteristics associated with redemptions in kind 
This table presents results for the determinants of RIK, using logit estimation. Observations are at fund-semi-annual 
level. The dependent variable, RIK, is an indicator variable that equals to one if the fund i’s investment company 
has filed for the exemption before time t, and zero otherwise. All the independent variables are defined in the 
Appendix Table A.2. Year dummies are included in all the specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the fund 
level. Odds ratios are reported, along with t-statistics in the parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 (1) (2) 
  RIK RIK    
Asset liquidity measures   
% equity funds 0.620** 0.575** 
 (-2.02) (-2.22)    
Illiquid 1.468*** 1.410*** 
 (3.89) (3.38)    
Alternative liquidity management measures   
% Cash 1.026*** 1.021*** 
 (3.94) (3.18)    
Borrow permission 0.927 0.976 
 (-0.68) (-0.21)    
Overdraft or bank loan  1.466*** 1.292*** 
 (6.09) (4.07) 
Fund Characteristics   
InvstCom size (log)  0.981 
  (-0.68)    
Fund size (log)  0.965 
  (-1.14)    
Load  1.724*** 
  (5.51)    
StdFlow  1.820 
  (1.62)    
Turnover  1.018 
  (0.34)    
Expense  1.215 
  (1.59)    
Age (log)  0.839** 
  (-2.53)    
Inst  1.112 
  (1.00)       
Year dummies Yes Yes 
N 43,740 42,281 
pseudo R-sq 0.013 0.031 
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Table A.4. Matched sample analysis of flow-performance sensitivities 
This table reports the estimation results of the flow-performance regressions in equation (2) using a matched sample created by entropy-balanced approach. 
Panel A shows the differences of fund and family characteristics between treatment and control funds. Panel B reports the results for the full sample. Panel C 
reports the results for the subsample of illiquid funds and liquid funds. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are reported in the parentheses, 
where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
Panel A 
 Treatment Control 
% equity funds 0.856 0.856 
Illiquid 0.328 0.328 
InvtCom size 8.270 8.270 
Fund size 5.620 5.620 
Load 0.771 0.771 
StdFlow 0.025 0.025 
Turnover 0.808 0.808 
Expense 0.013 0.013 
Age 4.919 4.919 
Inst 0.215 0.215 
% Cash 3.269 3.269 
Overdraft or bank loan 0.306 0.306 
Panel B 
 Full sample Negative performance Positive performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 
Perf 0.295*** 0.260*** 0.220*** 0.233*** 0.200*** 0.177*** 0.366*** 0.400*** 0.318*** 
 (7.86) (6.73) (5.68) (4.75) (3.64) (3.83) (5.25) (5.17) (4.24)           
Perf x RIK -0.072*** -0.054** -0.053** -0.047 -0.041 -0.017 -0.117** -0.134** -0.049 
 (-2.64) (-2.10) (-1.97) (-1.37) (-1.11) (-0.45) (-2.15) (-2.38) (-0.89)           
Control variables As in Table 3 As in Table 3 As in Table 3 
Fund and Style×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 244132 244132 244132 135038 138542 136834 109094 105590 107298 
Adj. R-sq 0.219 0.216 0.215 0.174 0.185 0.183 0.238 0.229 0.231 
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Table A.4. (continued) 
Panel C 
 Subsample of negative performance 
 Illiquid funds Liquid funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 
Perf 0.327*** 0.176* 0.198*** 0.238*** 0.235*** 0.181*** 
 (4.30) (1.67) (2.60) (4.17) (4.45) (3.30)        
Perf x RIK -0.109** -0.147** -0.155** -0.019 0.006 0.057 
 (-2.08) (-2.51) (-2.30) (-0.43) (0.14) (1.26)        
Control variables As in Table 3 As in Table 3 
Fund and Style x year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 41411 40925 40346 93627 97617 96488 
Adj. R-sq 0.199 0.212 0.208 0.162 0.172 0.172 
 Subsample of positive performance 
 Illiquid funds Liquid funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 
Perf 0.380*** 0.424*** 0.277** 0.440*** 0.454*** 0.406*** 
 (3.80) (3.90) (2.44) (5.06) (4.21) (4.15)        
Perf x RIK -0.079 -0.098 0.003 -0.166** -0.177*** -0.100 
 (-0.94) (-0.96) (0.03) (-2.44) (-2.64) (-1.58)        
Control variables As in Table 3 As in Table 3 
Fund and Style x year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 33559 34045 34624 75535 71545 72674 
Adj. R-sq 0.278 0.260 0.259 0.223 0.220 0.222 
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Table A.5. Funds’ portfolio churning behavior 
This table reports the estimation results of the equation (7), which examines mutual funds’ trading behavior in 
response to outflows using 13F quarterly holdings data. Panel A reports results for year 2004 to 2006, Panel B 
reports results for years 2007 to 2009, and Panel C reports results for years 2010 to 2012. Columns (1) to (2) are 
for the quarters without RIK transactions and columns (3) to (4) are for the quarters with RIK transactions. The 
dependent variable, Trade, is the percentage trading in a stock by the fund in a quarter, with split adjustments. Flow 
is the contemporaneous net quarterly flow. Am_illiqd is the Amihud illiquidity measure adjusted by the median of 
all stocks’ illiquidity held in the fund-quarter portfolio. AbSI is last month abnormal short interest before the 
beginning of the quarter, adjusted by the portfolio median. Control variables includes % of cash holdings, load, and 
the interaction terms between flow and these two variables. Observations are at fund-stock-quarter level. Standard 
errors are clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are reported in the parentheses, where *** indicates significance 
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
 
Fund-quarters without RIK 
disclosures 
Fund-quarters with RIK 
disclosures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Trade Trade Trade Trade 
Panel A. Year 2004-2006     
Flow 1.129*** 1.276*** 0.935*** 1.083*** 
 (19.80) (13.21) (14.41) (11.67) 
Am_illiqd 0.201** 0.210** -0.011 0.040 
 (2.34) (2.29) (-0.06) (0.23) 
Flow x Am_illiqd -1.259* -1.208 -3.338 -2.673 
 (-1.72) (-1.59) (-1.01) (-0.92) 
ABSI -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.000 0.001 
 (-9.86) (-9.78) (0.13) (0.29) 
Flow x ABSI -0.007* -0.007* 0.032** 0.034** 
 (-1.65) (-1.69) (2.14) (2.42) 
     
Control variables No Yes No  Yes 
N 729466 722132 17868 17868 
Adj. R-sq 0.011 0.011 0.035 0.036 
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Table A.5. (Continued)     
Panel B. Year 2007-2009     
 Fund-quarters without RIK disclosures Fund-quarters with RIK disclosures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Trade Trade Trade Trade 
Flow 0.961*** 1.041*** 1.017*** 0.874*** 
 (17.54) (12.94) (5.20) (3.80) 
Am_illiqd 0.171** 0.179** 0.860*** 0.811** 
 (2.01) (2.21) (3.71) (3.23) 
Flow x Am_illiqd -1.360 -1.176 8.016** 7.336** 
 (-1.12) (-0.94) (2.39) (2.38) 
ABSI -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.006 -0.006 
 (-9.10) (-9.03) (-1.44) (-1.44) 
Flow x ABSI 0.001 0.002 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.38) (0.48) (-0.71) (-0.59) 
     
Control variables No Yes No  Yes 
N 962920 961858 16191 16191 
Adj. R-sq 0.008 0.009 0.020 0.021 
     
Panel C. Year 2010-2012     
 Fund-quarters without RIK disclosures Fund-quarters with RIK disclosures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Trade Trade Trade Trade 
Flow 0.999*** 0.979*** 0.844*** 1.132*** 
 (23.79) (12.14) (5.48) (15.79) 
Am_illiqd 0.203*** 0.143** -0.173 0.010 
 (4.88) (2.28) (-0.83) (0.05) 
Flow x Am_illiqd -0.294 -0.734 8.204** 10.270** 
 (-0.49) (-1.00) (2.10) (2.61) 
ABSI -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (-9.04) (-9.36) (-0.53) (-0.44) 
Flow x ABSI -0.001 -0.001 0.010 0.013 
 (-0.14) (-0.20) (0.76) (1.03) 
     
Control variables No Yes No  Yes 
N 850411 850411 15835 15835 
Adj. R-sq 0.009 0.010 0.013 0.021 
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Table A.6. Flow-performance analysis using RIK usage information 
This table conducts the same flow-performance analysis as in Table 4 using the sample of funds that have used RIK 
during year 2004 to 2012 and funds that have never filed the exemption under Rule 18f1. RIK_user is 1 if the fund 
has used RIK during year 2004 to 2012. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and t-statistics are reported 
in the parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 Subsample of negative performance 
 Illiquid funds Liquid funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 
Perf 0.366*** 0.281* 0.344*** 0.189** 0.184** 0.213*** 
 (3.41) (1.82) (3.29) (2.31) (2.53) (3.28) 
       
Perf x RIK_user -0.160* -0.269*** -0.283*** 0.076 0.030 0.067 
 (-1.97) (-3.12) (-3.02) (1.23) (0.44) (1.12) 
       
Control variables As in Table 3 As in Table 3 
Fund and Style x Year 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 13835 13716 13571 35813 37364 37048 
Adj. R-sq 0.199 0.204 0.198 0.173 0.179 0.180 
       
 Subsample of positive performance 
 Illiquid funds Liquid funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 CAPM FF3 Carhart4 
Perf 0.361*** 0.377*** 0.391*** 0.385*** 0.472*** 0.510*** 
 (2.87) (2.63) (2.72) (3.43) (3.25) (3.58) 
       
Perf x RIK_user -0.106 -0.248* -0.113 -0.130 -0.158* -0.014 
 (-0.80) (-1.67) (-0.73) (-1.49) (-1.71) (-0.15) 
       
Control variables As in Table 3 As in Table 3 
Fund and Style x Year 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 11548 11667 11812 29214 27663 27979 
Adj. R-sq 0.249 0.241 0.245 0.211 0.212 0.212 
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Appendix B Tax treatment in RIK 
This Appendix provides a simplified example to illustrate the tax consequences associated with RIK. At the fund level, 
tax is deferred until the remaining shareholders sell their fund shares. At the redeeming shareholder level, the tax 
treatment is the same as if the shareholder redeemed in cash.   
Example. At time T1, Investor 1 buys 1 share of a fund at a NAV of 90. At time T2, fund share appreciates to 100 and 
Investor 2 buys 1 share. At time T3, fund share appreciates to 120 and Investor 1 redeems 1 share at 120. The following 
tables outline what happens with redemptions in cash and RIK.  
Redemptions in cash case 
 Fund NAV Fund portfolio Investor 1 Investor 2 
T 1 90 1 shr @ 90 (basis 90) Owns 1 share  
T 2 100 2 shr @ 100 (basis 190) Owns 1 share Owns 1 share 
T 3  9016 1 shr @ 120 
(sell one with basis of 90 with 
realized capital gain of 30 
distributed to investor 2) 
Redeems 1 share in cash (pay 
tax on $30, i.e., 120-90) 
Owns 1 share 
($30 distributed realized 
capital gain17) 
T 4 90 Sell @ 90  Redeem in cash (tax loss 
of -$10=90-100) 
 
RIK case 
 Fund NAV Fund portfolio Investor 1 Investor 2 
T 1 90 1 shr @ 90 (basis 90) Owns 1 share  
T 2 100 2 shr @ 100 (basis 190) Owns 1 share Owns 1 share 
T 3 120 1 shr @ 120 
(fund deliver the one with 
basis of 90) 
Redeem 1 share in kind (pay 
tax on $30, i.e., 120-90) 
 
Owns 1 share (no tax 
event) 
T 4 120 Sell @ 120   Redeem in cash ($20 
realized capital gain) 
 
For the remaining Investor 2, at time T3, the redemptions in cash example has a $30 realized capital gain while the 
RIK example doesn’t have any tax event. However, the total tax liability for investor 2 in both cases is $20 (the sum 
of $30 realized capital gain at time T3 and $10 realized capital loss at time T4). The only difference is the timing in 
tax. 
For the redeeming Investor 1, at time T3, the tax effect is the same in the case of cash redemptions and the RIK case.  
  
                                                          
16  https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitalgainsdistribution.asp. “As is the case with common stocks, the 
distribution of capital gains and dividends decreases the net asset value (NAV) of the fund by the amount distributed.”  
17 Dickson, Shoven, and Sialm (2000): The distribution of the realized gains (to the extent they are not reinvested in 
additional fund shares) would also be a negative cash flow event that could force further realizations.  
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Appendix C Examples of RIK disclosures in Form N-CSR and Form N-CSRS 
1. T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Stock Fund 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/75170/000007517008000003/arscs.htm 
“In-Kind Redemptions In accordance with guidelines described in the fund’s prospectus, the fund may distribute 
portfolio securities rather than cash as payment for a redemption of fund shares (in-kind redemption). For financial 
reporting purposes, the fund recognizes a gain on in-kind redemptions to the extent the value of the distributed 
securities on the date of redemption exceeds the cost of those securities. Gains and losses realized on in-kind 
redemptions are not recognized for tax purposes and are reclassified from undistributed realized gain (loss) to paid-in 
capital. During the year ended December 31, 2007, the fund realized $37,090,000 of net gain on $103,986,000 of in-
kind redemptions.” 
 
2. Putnam Global Equity Fund 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/81251/000092881606001553/a_globequityfnd.htm 
“For the year ended October 31, 2006, the fund had redemptions in kind totaling $360,562,936.  
Net realized gain on investments (including $55,683,088 from redemptions in kind) (Notes 1 and 3)  356,448,373”  
 
3. Sequoia Fund 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/89043/000008904311000002/ncsr.txt 
“The aggregate cost of purchases and the proceeds from the sales of securities, excluding U.S. government obligations, 
for the year ended December 31, 2010 were $567,738,908 and $757,968,488, respectively. Included in proceeds of 
sales is $52,896,079 representing the value of securities disposed of in payment of redemptions in-kind, resulting in 
realized gains of $42,755,343.  
During the year ended December 31, 2010 permanent differences primarily due to realized gains on redemptions in 
kind not recognized for tax purposes and different book and tax treatment of net realized gains on foreign currency 
transactions resulted in a net decrease in undistributed net realized gains of $42,735,019 with a corresponding increase 
in paid in surplus of $42,706,615, and an increase to undistributed net investment income of $28,404. These 
reclassifications had no effect on net assets. ” 
 
4. Royce Special Equity Fund 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/709364/000094937711000136/d27922.htm 
“The Funds may make payment for Fund shares redeemed wholly or in part by distributing portfolio securities to 
shareholders. For the year ended December 31, 2010, Royce Special Equity Fund had redemptions-in-kind with total 
proceeds in the amount of $7,257,223. The net realized gain on these redemptions-in-kind amounted to $184,263, 
which will not be realized for tax purposes.” 
 
5. Prudential Strategic Partners International Value Fund 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/741350/000119312505250597/dncsr.htm  
“Note 9. In-Kind Redemption 
  
During the fiscal year ended October 31, 2005, shareholders redeemed fund shares in exchange for Series’ portfolio 
securities valued at $148,897,793. The Fund realized a gain of $15,428,649 related to the in-kind redemption 
transactions. This gain is not taxable for Federal Income Tax purposes.” 
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6. Eaton Vance Tax-managed value fund 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/745463/000119312512519243/d452276dncsr.htm 
“1) Includes $2,904,269 of net realized gains from redemptions in-kind.”  
7. Excelsior Small Cap Fund 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/751200/000119312505123510/dncsr.htm 
     
Small Cap Fund 
   
     
Year Ended 
03/31/05 
     
Year Ended 
03/31/04 
   
     
Shares 
     
Amounts 
     
Shares 
     
Amounts 
   
Redemption 
in-kind    (1,099,692 )    (18,595,792 )   —     —  
     
  
  
   
  
  
  
   
 
8. VANGUARD QUANTITATIVE FUNDS Structured Large-Cap Equity Fund 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/799127/000093247109001082/quantitativefundsfinal.htm  
“During the six months ended March 31, 2009, the fund realized $20,147,000 of net capital losses resulting from in-
kind redemptions—in which shareholders exchanged fund shares for securities held by the fund rather than for cash. 
Because such losses are not taxable losses to the fund, they have been reclassified from accumulated net realized 
losses to paid-in capital.” 
 
